

EAST EUROPE

A Monthly Review of East European Affairs



JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN EASTERN EUROPE

"JESTS"—a story by Magda Leja

TWO VIEWS OF COEXISTENCE

PHILOSOPHY IN POLAND

A New Soviet Poem
A Church for Nowa Huta
An Answer to Marx?

JUNE 1960

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EAST EUROPE

Formerly NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

THE DESCENT

THE FIASCO IN PARIS caught the press of the Satellite countries in the posture of an orator who has suddenly lost his voice. Month after month, as the international procession wound its slow way upward to the summit, Communist publicists had been eloquent on the need for this sort of conference to settle some of the issues underlying the cold war. The harsh epithets which they formerly employed against the West had been mostly abandoned (except toward Chancellor Adenauer and other West German leaders) in an effort to show President Eisenhower as fundamentally a man of peace. Premier Khrushchev, likewise, had been transformed into a jolly man of the people—the antithesis of that dour, mustachioed figure that frowned over Eastern Europe less than a decade ago—and his journeyings abroad were proclaimed to have done much to reduce international tension.



The series of events which began with Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on May 5, in which he announced the capture of an American spy flying over the Ural mountains, and ended with his fantastic press conference in Paris on May 18, indicated that some unexpected shift had occurred in Moscow. While Western journalists found enough copy in this to keep them writing for weeks, their colleagues in Eastern Europe were not so fortunate. Deprived of the old guiding line, and with no clear indication of what the future might bring, the East European press could do little more than echo the statements made by their Soviet mentor.

DISILLUSION

THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE got their first intimation that the summit might be a failure two or three days before the conference began. The Czechoslovak Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague) began to disillusion its readers on May 13, with the observation that President Eisenhower's prestige had "fallen greatly." Previously, the paper said, it had appeared that President Eisenhower would play a "positive role" in improving East-West relations. "Although he did, from time to time, make statements at his press conferences that aroused justified mistrust, it was nevertheless generally believed that he had to pay lip service to the extremists around him and that personally he maintained more realistic views." But after he accepted full responsibility for the U-2 flight, "Eisenhower lost the right to be considered anything but the direct organizer of aggressive policy. . . . The Soviet Government can only draw the corresponding conclusions from the whole matter." Other press and radio statements on the eve of the conference emphasized that Khrushchev would do his best to insure successful negotiations, but that much would depend on the attitude of the West, and particularly of the United States.

USA TO BLAME

AFTER THE ABORTIVE MEETING of the four leaders in Paris on May 16, when Khrushchev demanded that President Eisenhower make a public apology for the U-2 flights, punish those responsible for them, and promise not to renew them in the future, commentators in Eastern Europe placed the responsibility for the new crisis on the United States. Hungary's Deputy Foreign Minister Janos Peter said: "I am convinced that Comrade Khrushchev is acting in the interest of peace and all mankind, including the Hungarian people. . . ." He added that the US had tried

deliberately to sabotage the conference by poisoning the international atmosphere. In another broadcast, Radio Budapest showed some concern over public reaction to the startling news. "Comrade Khrushchev's statement on the afternoon of May 16 was received with a certain amount of surprise throughout the world, although it was by no means totally unexpected and it was definitely a logical consequence of the events which had preceded it. Nevertheless, it seemed unexpected and, to some circles, even regrettable. Even among us the question arose: Has it increased international tension, or, to put it more plainly, has the danger of war become greater? The answer is a firm and categorical 'no!'" The Bulgarian news service reported that meetings of workers were being held throughout the country "branding the perfidious and provocative conduct of the American government with indignation." Quoting extensively from the Soviet news agency TASS, it said that Premier Khrushchev could not be expected to sit at a table with representatives of a government which had made a cult of espionage against the USSR.

TO THE PEOPLE

THUS, WHEN IT BECAME clear that the conference had irrevocably failed, there was no difficulty in assigning the guilt. Prague headlines on May 18 read as follows: "Attitude of the US Torpedoed the Summit Conference," "USA Wrecked the Conference," "Soviet Government Confirms Resolute Will to Secure Peace," "USA Bears Full Responsibility for Breakdown of the Conference." Khrushchev's histrionic news conference was reported throughout the Soviet bloc, and Polish newspapers printed the full text of the proceedings. But editorial comment was beginning to wear thin.

There was virtually nothing in the canned opinions to suggest the existence of frail human beings who suffer and are afraid. While Radio Warsaw was dutifully intoning that "Polish opinion and the opinion of the entire Socialist camp and of the world sees the future with calmness, sees no war," some Western correspondents in Warsaw were reporting "consternation" and "dismay" at the breakup of the conference. From Hungary there also came evidence of a gulf between official sentiments and those of ordinary people. Radio Budapest reported on May 18 that workers in the Lang Machine Factory had shown such a "tense reaction" to the news from Paris that it had been necessary to hold a meeting and "explain" the situation to them "correctly." The broadcast assured listeners that "today even these people are again working normally as before and everyone looks ahead with confidence." And on the same day the Hungarian Party newspaper *Nepszabadsag* referred to a certain Professor Kovacs who "asked if it was wise for Khrushchev to condemn the West with such harsh words for its aerial penetration of the USSR." The report added that "finally even this man was convinced."

THE FUTURE

AS THE WEEK ENDED, and the four leaders went home to assess the consequences of their failure to hold a conference which nobody had been very optimistic about in the first place, the press and radio of the Soviet bloc hummed with righteous indignation. Factory meetings from East Berlin to Sofia passed resolutions denouncing the "provocative actions" of the United States and stating support for the firm stand of the USSR. In Hungary, Party leader Janos Kadar made a labored attempt at optimism. He told a meeting of the National Front on May 21 that Khrushchev had rendered a great service to the cause of peace. It was true that the Western imperialists had succeeded in increasing world tension, he said, but in every important respect they had been defeated. As for Hungary, he added, "our internal and foreign policies remain unchanged. We will always counter energetically the intentions of anybody who attempts to interfere with our internal affairs. On the other hand, we are always ready to cooperate on the basis of peaceful coexistence among nations with different social orders."

The road up to the summit had been a tortuous one, but the road down looked even more difficult. Until some new policy directive emerged from the mysterious councils in Moscow, the best the East European Communists could do was to hold fast, cheer the leader, and pretend that nothing had changed.

The Youth Problem

Juvenile Delinquency in Eastern Europe

ON A RAILROAD STATION platform in the Polish provincial town of Prudnik, a Youth League official is set upon and beaten by a gang of youths. In Opava, Czechoslovakia, a group of schoolchildren calling themselves "Indians" break into a series of cottages and a Pioneer Home where they demolish 20,000 *koruny*—about \$3,000—worth of furnishings. A reporter for a Slovak newspaper describes a beer hall melee among 17-year-old factory workers as a routine event: "You should see it on pay-days. . . ."

Juvenile delinquency plunges through the surface of organized society like an angry fist. A source of growing alarm in the West, it is perhaps even more seriously regarded in the Soviet bloc, not because there is a greater amount of it, but because of the regimes' greater claim—and need—for public order, unity and acquiescence. In a totalitarian society nonconformity is more than a social error.

Such behavior has been on the increase since the war in the Communist and non-Communist world alike, and it expresses itself in much the same terms wherever it appears, and seems to involve many of the same factors. The similarities of mode and form are striking in social systems often considered antithetical.

SWIAT (Warsaw), March 1, 1959



The difference lies in large part in the judgment of "authority" as to what juvenile delinquency actually is, and who and what is threatened by it.

The Communist regimes see juvenile delinquency as an aspect of both the class war and the Cold War. This stems in part from the dogma that juvenile delinquency is a product of the social injustice and instability of capitalism. On this basis the Soviet bloc regimes are hard put to account for it in their own society—except as a legacy or import from the non-Communist world. The West is accused of circulating vicious crime literature, of incitement in radio broadcasts, of seeking in all ways to subvert the youth of Eastern Europe for its own political purposes. At a press conference following a riot in Prague in 1957, the Czechoslovak Minister of Interior spoke darkly of "the diplomatic cars of certain Western embassies which were cruising around waiting to see how things were going to develop."¹ Much of this, of course, is part of the perennial Communist use of the West as a scapegoat. But it can also be seen as a measure of a totalitarian regime's sense of its own vulnerability. From the anarchistic rebelliousness of the hooligan to the organized attack of a political or class opposition, from "anti-social" to "anti-State," there is but a short step. Thus, inveighing against local rowdies, *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), October 26, 1957, said: "The hooligans are the spiritual brothers of our arch-enemies, they have their confreres in [Radio] Free Europe; we well know what the Polish and Hungarian hooligans were capable of, what bestialities they committed in the name of 'freedom.' . . ."

To the extent that youth in Eastern Europe have historically played a more important role in political movements than have their Western counterparts, the political slant consistently given to juvenile delinquency is perhaps justified. It also makes it convenient for the regimes to downgrade, and punish, all youthful opposition as "hooliganism," as does the Kadar regime in its references to those who fought in the Hungarian Revolt.

Not only openly aggressive acts but more oblique forms of evading the official social "norms" are considered a kind of delinquency. Thus, the private teenage culture—the fads of dress, slang, music, dances and other grotesqueries, mystifying to the adult world in Western Europe and America but tolerated in free societies with a smile or a shudder—is condemned by the Communists as an alien "culture" contending with their own which claims to embrace all legitimate human needs.

"HOOLIGANS AND WISE GUYS"

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, in strict usage, is a legal term for criminal behavior in youth between the ages of 14* and 18 (the age of full legal liability). Hooliganism is less a technical term than an epithet (although it also has a legal meaning) applied loosely by the Communists to "anti-social" behavior ranging from brutal assault to the affectation of bizarre manners and dress. It has no age limits, but generally involves boys in their 'teens and early twenties.

* 12 in Romania.



"Look at those hooligans! And nobody here to make them behave!"
URZICA (Bucharest), June 15, 1959

"Among the negative symptoms [of youth], the first one we must register is the gang spirit which emerges here and there," wrote the Hungarian *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), December 25, 1959. "The young people overinterested in or addicted to alcohol. The army of *jampecs* [zoot-suiters] with their cynical bragging. Hooligan excesses. . . . The intolerably bad manners of youth throughout almost the whole country, its jazz jargon, in some places its obscenity. . . ."

"Youths gather in groups in public places and carry on shamefully, particularly with girls," wrote the Bulgarian *Cherueno Zname* (Vidin), May 18, 1956. "They shout and hiss in the movies; the [performances] at the municipal theater are quite often accompanied by incredible noise. Their roaming in the streets at night and yelling under windows are something we are all familiar with. . . . A particular form of hooliganism is attacks on children and helpless people. The hooligans strike in groups of three and four, then vanish in the dark." The paper cited a number of such assaults, some involving serious injury.

Czechoslovakia had an outbreak of teenage violence in the fall of 1957. The initial explosion was a riot in Prague's Wenceslas Square on the night of October 12. According to the official account by Radio Prague, this began when a drunken soldier refused to show his papers to the military police, and the "hooligans pouring out of the bars" jumped into the fray, attacking the civil police and "shouting anti-State slogans." Eleven were arrested, all juveniles except one, and sentenced to prison terms of 14 days to three years. A series of hooligan "incidents" ensued; four trials of teenage hooligan groups were reported during the last week of October.

Systematic stealing and vandalism are egregious forms of hooliganism. (In Bulgaria, for example, 80 percent of all juvenile crimes are thefts.) Breaking windows, removing park benches, puncturing automobile tires, wreaking havoc in trains and streetcars—all the familiar litany of random destructiveness is regularly recited in the indictments before the juvenile courts.

These teenage marauders generally operate in groups, about whose inner workings little is revealed in the Communist press. Poland is the only Soviet bloc country to have published the results of intensive investigation into teenage gangs; some of these show patterns similar to those in the West.

A study of the formation, composition and activities of gangs published in *Nowe Prawo*, (Warsaw) December 1959,* divided them into two genres: those engaged in crimes against property, and those engaged in "hooligan excesses"—rowdyism. The majority (63 percent) belong in the first category. These are usually made up of three to seven boys, fewer than in the hooligan gangs. The members are drawn together by neighborhood acquaintance and a common dislike of school, resulting in truancy and finally compulsory or voluntary quitting. Their crimes (in decreasing order of seriousness) include: robbery attacks on passersby, on taxi drivers, on drunks; breaking into warehouses, stores, houses, schools, sheds, passenger cars; thefts from recreation rooms and open-air markets; thefts of building materials from outdoor stockpiles, of bicycles left in the street, of passengers' luggage in railroad stations; picking pockets; and finally, stealing poultry from streets and yards as well as flowers and fruit from gardens.

In the second category are groups of boys which engage in hooligan activities only sporadically and others which pursue them systematically. Members of the latter variety drink heavily, going out into the streets afterwards for the express purpose of beating up someone, starting a fight, or breaking up a bona fide youth gathering.

In addition, the report mentioned "sub-" or fringe groups of boys, somewhat younger, who are chiefly interested in diversions which their parents, schools or youth organizations could not or do not provide. Hooligan excesses in these cases are marginal, "the result not so much of conscious attitudes as overabundance of freedom and various negative patterns of behavior." These groups meet at a designated spot to discuss the motion pictures they have seen, to read aloud books which are difficult to get, or simply to make plans for some other kind of excursion. Afterwards they go to the movies, to the ball park, to the banks of the Vistula, or "to somebody's garden for fruit." Other boys organize clubs dedicated to one or several sports, usually soccer. Almost half (43 percent) of all "hooligan gangs" fall somewhere between this kind of group and the aggressively criminal kind. Some grow into a more advanced species, with an elaborate organization, a permanent "hang-out", a "battlefield" on which they fight rival gangs.

Epater La Bourgeoisie

But hooliganism is not invariably violent: it also includes truancy, "shirking work," and a predilection for Western dress styles, jazz and jitterbugging. In each Soviet bloc



"Don't worry about it. My father will take care of everything."
DIKOBRAZ (Prague), March 24, 1960

country the "smart alecs" have a label—*bikiniarze* in Poland, *jampec* in Hungary, *pasek* in Czechoslovakia—all the counterparts of the English "Teddy boys" or the American "leather jackets." Beards and black sweaters, the caste marks of the US beats, have appeared, although not yet constituting a movement.

The "Western" styles (many of which would be unrecognizable in the West) are condemned by the regime not only because of their geographical origin, but because the teenagers who espouse them display a "scoffing" attitude toward the society in which they find themselves. The urge of the adolescent to stress his individuality, often by pitting it against the authority and customs around him, has no outlet in the highly regimented society of the Soviet bloc. The massive external pressures for conformity themselves breed this penchant for the outlandish among the young: the cult of duck-tail haircuts and hot jazz seems primarily an attempt to dramatize themselves and their drably utilitarian everyday life.

A glimmering comprehension of this is now evident among the more "liberal" students of the problem in the Soviet bloc (almost exclusively in Poland and Hungary). That there can be hooligans in grey flannel suits, as it were, and honest youths in dungarees, is to some extent recognized. Peter Ruffy, a well-known Hungarian journalist, cited in this connection the case of a young worker of exemplary habits (he neither smokes nor drinks, and is respectful to his superiors), who deprives himself of all else for the sake of clothes. "He shines his pointed Italian shoes at home for hours on end. He saves, penny by penny, for a pair of new tight pants. A spartan *jampec*! But—is he a hooligan?" Ruffy said that inevitably the older generation is offended by such displays, but, he argued, "vanity is not yet real danger."

"Last year and the year before," Ruffy said, "our press caricatured the hooligans in their tight pants, cropped jackets, sloping shoulders, Italian shoes, and multi-colored socks. And what happened this year? Our factories, wholesale and retail trade started mass production of narrow

* Based on analysis of 150 court cases tried in Warsaw, Lodz and Cracow involving 120 juvenile criminal groups of young people between 15 and 20 years old. The crimes were committed between 1953 and 1955.

Italian-style shoes . . . short jackets with sloping shoulders . . . colored socks, ties with horizontal stripes. . . . Our industry does not follow the hooligan fashion, it is just trying to keep up with the new. . . ."¹²

The September 2, 1959 issue of *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) posited a key difference between "fashion" and "ideological" *jampecs*. Among the former, the *jampec* style of talking and dressing are external affectations of "basically sound" youngsters. The "ideological" *jampec*, on the other hand, disregards and often deliberately rejects "the forms and aims of social life." He is a self-conscious egotist concerned only with his inner world. "Such a youngster puts himself in the foreground of the universe, and anyone who does not appreciate his desires is his enemy. This type is rarer in our country than in the West; it is from the West that he receives these ideas and harmful influences."

Solipsism is a vice if not a legal crime in a collectivist society, and the Communists are concerned over the growth

of an identifiable group of youth whose "attitude" constitutes as great a danger to the Communist system as do the excesses of rowdies and criminals. Most ominously, these come in large part from the new, Communist-created intelligentsia. In the Soviet Union a distinct "set" composed of the sons and daughters of government officials, Army officers, etc., has arisen, an indulged and self-indulgent *jeunesse dorée*, whose penchant for wild parties and fast cars often leads to scandals and even crime. In Eastern Europe, where social and economic stratification under Communist rule is not so advanced, the behavior of "self-seeking" young people is not openly degenerate or irresponsible: the distinction, and connection, between them and the overtly "anti-social" was precisely charted in an article published by *Po Prostu* (Warsaw), October 30, 1955.

The article defined hooligans as anarchistic criminal elements, exclusively male, between 14 and 22 years old, and predominantly from the worker-peasant class. They revel

INTERVIEWS IN A HUNGARIAN JUVENILE COURT *NEPSZABADSAG* (Budapest), July 12, 1959

The court proceedings have been going on for days. There were sixteen [of them]—the gang leader is 25, the others 15-20 years of age. Two young divorced women were also members of the gang: they filled the roles of procuresses and fences.

They are the terror of the State grocery stores, of the tearrooms, of the private cars left outdoors. . . . They threw their weight around, scuffed, ruled the Varosmajor [Park] . . . and they stole . . . some forty thousand forint [roughly \$4,000] worth. Their method? They broke the window on the airshafts of the stores and pilfered the merchandise. In the tearrooms, they danced with the girls and then robbed them. They picked the lock of cigar and grocery stores and carried off what was movable. They frightened small children in the street and took their money away. They broke the windows of passenger cars left unguarded and took out the seat covers and valuables left there. After all, one can make money out of everything! And money is particularly needed when the head and several members of the "gallery" have not worked for a year. This is a typical gang of hooligans; the dark bushy corners of the Varosliget [Park] are their quarters, the entire capital their area, and the apartment of Mrs. Laszlo Balazs and Mrs. Istvan Kovacs, their drinking and merrymaking place.

Out in the hall I ask the prosecutor's permission to speak to the young defendants. I invite to a bench Tibor P., second-in-charge of the gallery, who is not quite 18. . . . I offer him a cigarette, he almost snatches it from my hand. . . .

"Where did you work before they caught you?"

"Nowhere."

"You don't like to work?"

"Why should I? Would you perhaps, sir, drive a nail into your own coffin?"

"Where did you hear that expression? Did you read it?"

"I don't know."

"When was the last time you read a novel?"

"In prison. Now. We got some. There is nothing to do anyway. You can't talk all day to your cell buddy."

"And before?"

"Well, I read. . . . Wait. When was that? Long ago, that's true. In school."

"What did the girls say when you robbed them?"

"What? Robbed? Where did you hear that? We only took a few things away from them. . . . We slapped them and they kept quiet."

"What did your father think of all this?"

"He didn't know! (he laughs). The old man quacked when he read the charges."

"He also didn't know that you spent entire nights away from home?"

"Look, sir, I'm no child any more."

"What about the price of the stolen articles? How will you pay it back?"

"We'll work in jail."

"How many years do you expect?"

"Sir, I am still a minor. They cannot give me more than three."

"Months?"

"Don't joke, now. Years."

The recess is over, the conversation ends. In Indian file, the "gallery" goes back to the court room. Among them I see a 15-year old child. They said about him that he "kept a woman" and regularly demanded and received money from her, as a "fixed rate."

in brawls, drunkenness, wild dances and sex orgies.

The social conduct of the "wise guys," on the other hand, is unexceptionable, but their attitude toward the values of the "new Poland" is mocking and skeptical; they are indifferent to politics and "Socialism": they "know it all" and consider education a kind of slavery.

The reasons these disaffected young people are a more serious problem than the hooligans are several: hooligans, the author said, can be dealt with by "administrative measures"—the law and the police—while the "wise guys" cannot be isolated and neutralized in this way. Further, the author maintained, the hooligans are growing up in "slum environments which will be liquidated in the course of Socialist construction," while the "wise guys" are multiplying in the new suburbs of cities such as Warsaw and Prague. The hooligans usually come from broken or criminal families, but the "wise guys" are found among "children of shock-workers, of simple people who have reached high positions by their own efforts, of leaders in the cultural field. . . . An especially large number come from the families of outstanding but opportunistic scientists and artists."

Most important, the hooligans do not aspire to be a conscious influence in the national life, but the "wise guys" are ambitious: "they have their plans, they try to get scholarships, build careers, and occupy key positions."

CAUSES AND FACTORS

THE ONCE PREVAILING belief that juvenile delinquency is spawned by slums has been cast into doubt by the postwar rise in youthful crime alongside the growth of mass prosperity in the West, and by the existence of delinquents at all levels of income and education. (Indeed, some Western observers are now suggesting that general affluence can foster delinquency for a variety of reasons.) Poverty is still a major strand, but only one in a whole tangled complex of roots.

Some of the factors which contribute to demoralization of youth in American cities are insignificant in Eastern Europe. The racial and ethnic frictions are with few exceptions absent. The cult of violence attributed by some critics to comic books, movies and television in the West does not afflict the Communist State-controlled mass media, which are scrubbed clean to the point of sterilization. The problem created by narcotics traffic appears, happily, a marginal one in Eastern Europe,* although liquor plays a much larger part in juvenile crime.

In general, it is modern industrial life—the new mobility, the congestion and at the same time isolation of individuals in large cities, the erosion of traditional standards and values and of sources of security—which breeds restlessness and confusion in the young. In the Soviet bloc, industrialization has been carried out at far greater pressure and

speed than in the West, and the resulting social upheaval is proportionally greater. This upheaval, of course, was one of the objectives of Communist policy.

The Breakdown of the Family

The decay of family life in the process of social change is exacerbated in Eastern Europe by low living standards, official labor policy, and Party propaganda against the "reactionary" nature of family authority. Mass employment in industry, imposed on them by pressure and need, has taken women out of the home; the tensions arising from overcrowding drive the young out onto the streets. The number of families separated or completely sundered as a result first of the war, now of the housing shortage, job demands, and the availability of divorce (the divorce rate in Prague has been as high as 50 percent), has soared, creating a whole army of castaways forced to fend for themselves by any means.

How a teenage criminal gang may evolve into a surrogate "family" assuming all the functions of a complete



The sign on the movie theater says: "For adults over 18 only." One girl remarks, "They won't let you in." The other girl replies, "I can't go anyway; there's nobody for me to leave the baby with."

SZPILKI (Warsaw), September 6, 1959

* While narcotics have not been cited as a factor in Eastern Europe, juvenile drug addicts, and their exploitation by professional criminals, have been discussed in Soviet Russia (e.g. *Kommunist Tadzhikstana*, November 22, 1958.)

household was described in *Panstwo i Prawo*, organ of the Institute of Legal Science attached to the Polish Academy of Sciences, in January 1960:

"Twelve Lodz boys, ages 16 and 17, have constituted a 'stealing' group for some time. When the mother of one of them was arrested for stealing, the boy was left all alone. Two of his friends, whose family situations were the worst of all (poverty, alcoholism, brawls) moved in with him and organized a normal household which also provided shelter for the other boys whose family conflicts were not much better.

"The boys shared all duties. Several were in charge of the household chores, others stole, and still others concerned themselves with the sale of the stolen poultry and the purchase of needed goods. Unusually interesting is the fact that the boys, as a 'family,' behaved relatively properly. Proof of this is that the arrangement lasted almost two months and there were no complaints from neighbors of any disturbances by the boys. Not all the boys even drank, and those who did drink did not exceed any bounds, since no drunken fights, etc., were ever reported. The group had its own budget. The major part of the income was spent on good food, far less on liquor and movies. The boys were quite willing to spend their time at home. . . . They went out chiefly to do the shopping. . . . They went to the movies about twice a week and also frequented the local amusement park. Besides movies, merry-go-rounds, card and ball games, roaming and drinking wine, the boys have no other amusements."

This extreme case points up the fact that the core of many "criminal" groups is composed of boys whose basic requirements are not met by their families. The group satisfies the boys' material and emotional needs and defends them in the event of conflict with the community.

Further examples of how such boys surround with special care and protection any member whose situation is "more than usually unfortunate" were given. A group in Bialystok, composed of six boys between the ages of 13 and 15, does most of its stealing for one of its members who is being especially exploited and starved by his family. "There is no doubt that the boy enjoys the special protection of his group and the ambition of its members is that he should never go hungry."

Similarly a group in Warsaw has its own special pet, an extremely undernourished boy suffering from tuberculosis. "If we stole cold cuts or grapes, it was usually for him." On the whole, similar protectiveness was clearly evident among all the criminal groups studied, even those in which the stronger members take advantage of the weaker as a matter of routine. The member of a group who runs away from home as a result of a family crisis for example, is provided with special group protection, "regardless of either permanent or momentary personal antipathies. . . . The group then provides him with lodging and food and warns him of any threatening danger. . . ."

Reconstruction of the family unit is avowedly not one of the goals of Communist policy. In several countries high officials have recently proclaimed the State's intention to take over more and more of its functions: household services and above all, the care and upbringing of children. At the same time, if the family is something less than sac-



A Hungarian poet of the sixteenth century wrote an epic poem on the struggle against the Turks. In this cartoon he has returned to Budapest to write another poem on the struggle against delinquency.

LUDAS MATYI (Budapest), September 10, 1959

rosant in Communist society, the accountability of parents for their children's conduct and welfare has been tightened in recent years. Parental negligence in case of juvenile delinquency was made a prison offense in Romania in 1956, and a similar law, providing prison sentences of up to two years, was enacted in Hungary in 1958. Culpable under this law is the parent who "drinks away his pay," beats his children, sets them an example of immoral conduct, or "imperils their intellectual development by making remarks in their presence which are in opposition to the policies of the People's Democracy."³

THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNITY

THE BEHAVIOR OF THE younger generation reflects that of adult society, and this raises the question of "adult delinquency." And there it is acknowledged that petty crime has become a built-in feature of life in Eastern Europe. Bribery, theft, fraud, pilfering, bilking the State in every possible way, are engaged in and taken for granted by almost the whole population: it is commonly asserted that the economic machine could not "work"—and that the ordinary working man could barely survive—without this elaborate system of "improvising." These practices, and the cynicism they breed, are not lost on the younger generation.

Unemployment and Idleness

That idleness primes juvenile waywardness is obvious to all. Communist propaganda lashes out at the youth for "loafing" and "shirking work." It is not, however, a simple case of laziness among the East European youth. There is much job frustration among them, particularly among the higher school and university graduates who cannot find jobs at their intellectual level and who shrink from going into manual labor. Unemployment caused by the economic reorganization in Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1958, and earlier in Bulgaria, affected particularly the young, inexperienced workers. At the same time, the lifting of severe Stalinist labor discipline controls—work cards, internal passports, etc.—makes it possible for unemployed youth to fall into errant ways relatively unhampered.

The present changes in the school system—lengthening school years and introducing factory work to accompany

classroom studies ("polytechnicism") will probably mitigate youthful idleness. In Hungary, a particular problem were the children who left school at 14, after the compulsory eight years, but were forbidden by law to take jobs until they were 16, thus literally being forced into inactivity. In mid-1958 the government issued a decree providing for their employment in factories as "helpers," subject to certain working conditions.⁴

Lack of employment for legitimate leisure hours is also a major factor in juvenile delinquency. The cities, particularly the raw new coal-and-steel towns such as Nowa Huta in Poland, teeming with youth who have migrated from the rural districts, are notoriously lacking in recreation facilities such as playgrounds, movies, places to dance: "raising hell" becomes the only means of entertainment. Boredom and restlessness lead to "hooliganism, drinking, card-playing, sexual adventures."⁵ And although primarily an urban phenomenon, hooliganism flourishes in the terrible boredom of the small provincial towns, where there are absolutely no outlets for youthful energies. Of some 4,000 hooligan "incidents" in Warsaw Province in 1959, almost three-quarters occurred in the villages.⁶

Drinking plays a significant role in Soviet bloc juvenile crime. The Sofia press has said that the average case of hooliganism is almost invariably associated with alcohol. Investigations by the Warsaw juvenile courts showed that in eight out of ten cases of juvenile delinquency, the object of the first offense—usually theft—was to obtain money for vodka, and *Trybuna Ludu*, April 10, 1957, said that teenagers were spending State scholarship stipends on liquor.

But there is a kind of boredom and emptiness among the youth which goes beyond the matter of playgrounds and movie palaces. If the delinquent youth of the Western industrial cities conceive of the world as a "jungle," those in Eastern Europe seem to see it as a flatland, a desert. The regime crusades, organizations, "planned" activities, fail to ignite their imaginations. There is no one for them to idealize and emulate—parents, of course, have been divested of any such role, and the hardworking lathe operator somehow has little glamor, despite the unceasing efforts to glorify him as hero. The young people, complain the Communists, seek their models in the gangsters romanticized in the "gutter" literature of the West.

JUVENILE CRIME RATES AND TRENDS

Official pronouncements by the Communist regimes generally assert that juvenile delinquency is declining in the Soviet bloc countries, although statistics and official action bely such claims. Only Poland, the frankest and most open of the Communist societies, admits that juvenile delinquency has risen and is still rising under the "Socialist" system. The Bulgarian *Narodna Tribuna* (Lom), February 9, 1960, said that since the 1944 Communist "liberation" youthful crime had dropped to three percent of the total, thus "placing our country among the foremost in the world in the decline of juvenile delinquency." The Bulgarian press has virtually ceased to report cases of juvenile delinquency since 1958, and the situation in Romania is veiled in official obscurity.

The official figures published in Hungary on court proceedings against juvenile delinquents show a consistent and sharp decline up to 1958, and a slight rise in that year, continuing into 1959. The State Prosecutor, Dr. Geza Szenasi, declared during the parliamentary debate on the 1959 budget that the number of juvenile criminals had further decreased during the previous year. (*Nepszabadsag*, February 21, 1959.) But the provincial press in this period (1958) reported a considerable rise in the number of convicted delinquents, and *Nogradai Nepujsag* (Salgotarjan), said on July 4, 1959, that although decreasing, juvenile crimes are of more serious nature than in the past.

The Polish *Trybuna Ludu*, February 22, 1960, reported an increase in Warsaw juvenile court cases from 815 in

1957 to 1,410 in 1959. A similar rise was evident on the national level: juvenile courts throughout the country tried some 15,000 cases in 1957, 17,000 in 1958, and over 12,000 in the first six months of 1959.

While some of the increase was attributable to the growth of the teenage population, the Polish paper said that the "coefficient of criminality" among youth is also rising. In 1956 juvenile delinquents constituted .44 percent of youth between 10 and 17; in 1957 the percentage was .49, and in 1958 it was .52. The paper said that although this coefficient was still below the level in the United States, West Germany or Great Britain, it was "sufficient cause for concern."

By contrast, in the spring of 1959 Czechoslovakia's Minister of Interior Rudolf Barak announced that a healthy and hopeful new trend was underway. This was said to be an "incontestable fact" despite apparent skepticism on the part of the public: "Some pessimists and grumblers . . . are of the opinion that delinquency is growing among young people," Barak said in *Kvetly* (Prague). "The opposite is true!" He said that while the ratio of convicted delinquents per 100,000 citizens was 45 in 1954, it had dropped to 35 in 1957. These figures were compared with the 1954 ratios of 410 per 100,000 in the United States and 146 in West Germany. And, Barak added, "delinquency in these countries is still increasing, as a result of the crisis in the economy. . . . The comparison shows that the 'American way of life' does not have real roots among our young people and that our Socialist reality is fully effective."

Failure of the Mystique

The moral malaise of the Soviet bloc youth, particularly the educated and sensitive, goes back to the rule of Stalinism: the flouting of legal processes by police terror, the ever-widening gap between pious propaganda claims and visible reality, and the subsequent repudiation of the system by leading Communist writers and intellectuals, some of them much esteemed by the youth. The reaction was that of all young people who feel defrauded: "It awakened in youth new forms of resistance, both instinctive and conscious, ranging from passivity to hooliganism. . . . Youth is perfectly aware of the inconsistency of orders that change from day to day . . . the changes in concepts . . . and the sometimes unjust solutions to certain problems."⁷

It was not only the vagaries of the Party line or the perversion of Communist ideals by a corrupt elite, but the whole ideology itself which seemed to these young people to have undermined the moral basis of society. "In recent discussions young people have shown their distaste for all forms of shallow ethical relativism. Certain of them [seemed to have the idea] that Marxism, as a materialist ideology based on economics . . . was the generator of this relativism whose practical consequences are dire indeed."

And the March 2, 1958, issue of *Gazeta Robotnicza* (Wrocław) summed up the results of an opinion poll among university students: "Everyone . . . will agree that the traditional religious ideals are rapidly decaying in student circles, and the new ideas do not fill the vacuum. No wonder—especially after the political and moral dramas of 1956—individualistic nihilism is growing, expressed in a daily shout: everything is bunk!"

Still in Question

A writer in *Kultura* (Prague), April 16, 1959, expressed the bewilderment felt by those everywhere who try to sum up the causes of juvenile delinquency: "Currently the guilty factors are constantly being sought. The school, the parents, the plant, the hostel; jazz, money, city life, Western fashions, deficiencies in the Czechoslovak Youth League,

the historical problems of the period? There are endless discussions and the youngsters often don't even know they are being discussed." Similarly, in the Warsaw paper *Polityka*, Jerzy Sawicki cited the war, crime fiction and movies, the collapse of authority as a result of "changes in the class structure," and the migration of young people to the cities. "And perhaps," he added, "there is a close though still unknown connection between the primitive attitude of people who commit crimes for no apparent reason, that is, hooligans, and the sublimated but common attitude of the intellectuals, with their 'nostalgie de la boue'?"⁸

CONTROL AND PREVENTION

JUVENILE CRIME is, in the first instance, a police problem. The regimes are trying to enlist the active assistance of the man-on-the-street, who allegedly displays indifference towards obvious juvenile misdemeanors and reluctance to step into street fights. Czechoslovakia (which has an evening curfew for teenagers) has set up "official norms" binding the public to watch for and report young people loitering at night, disposing of large sums of money, buying liquor and attending unsuitable films. Elsewhere, voluntary brigades of members of the Party mass organizations—trade union, women's league, youth league, etc.—are being organized to patrol the streets and parks. According to *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), March 13, 1960, their influence will be exercised primarily through "persuasion and warning" (meaning, presumably, that they will not be armed). The regimes are also tightening enforcement of the law against the sale of alcohol to minors, often ignored by taverns and restaurants in the greater interest of meeting their sales "quotas." Hungary has begun to close down liquor stores and bars located near schools and factories.

The Communist regimes stress education and rehabilitation in dealing with juvenile delinquents. Under the penal codes (based on the Soviet master code), criminal offenders below the age of 18 cannot be given the death penalty.

* Yearning for the sordid (lit. "mud").



This photo, from a magazine article criticizing Western TV programs, claims to show a Slovak child watching a program from Austria.
SLOVENKA (Bratislava), April 4, 1960



Students at Warsaw Polytechnic have been accused of wrecking a dormitory. Here they are shown discussing functional architecture.
SZPILKI (Warsaw), December 13, 1959

(Under a legal provision passed by the Kadar regime, the death penalty can be imposed on minors of 16 and over for "acts aimed at overthrowing the Communist order." This provision was the "legal" basis for the execution in 1957-59 of youths who fought in the 1956 Revolt.)

Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland have special juvenile courts; the other Soviet bloc countries do not. But all provide for the separation of juvenile from adult offenders in the courts and institutions. In juvenile delinquency cases, the court is required to conduct a "social investigation" of the background and circumstances.

As a result of the increase in juvenile lawlessness, penal sanctions were stiffened in Romania and Poland in 1957 and 1958. The Romanian decree extended both the sphere of application of the crime of "hooliganism" and the length of sentences (previously from 3 months to two years, now six months to five years). The Polish law also imposed harsher penalties, including longer prison terms, for hooliganism.

A comprehensive law enacted in Bulgaria in February 1958 is angled toward broadening the bases of combatting juvenile delinquency. Its main new feature is the establishment of special court procedures and schools for difficult or pre-delinquent children. These so-called labor-educational schools are under the Ministry of Education and are distinct from the "corrective homes" run by the Ministry of Justice for delinquents serving court sentences. Both types of institutions provide for regular academic instruction and "re-education through labor" in workshops and farms. The law also provides for the regulation and coordination of social agencies such as the "children's pedagogical rooms," set up at the local national councils, whose task is to uncover, study and make recommendations for individual cases of delinquency; and special commissions engaged in research and administration of measures against juvenile crime.

A children's town, modelled on Makarenko's experimental villages in the Soviet Union, was set up by the Hungarian regime in 1957 for vagrant and pre-delinquent children (an earlier children's town organized in Hungary in 1950 was later dissolved). As of the end of 1958 the "town," which occupies a former nobleman's castle near Budapest, had 450 inhabitants. Subsequently a number of similar communities were established throughout the country.

Apart from the "progressive" principles on which they are theoretically based, little is known of the institutions for young offenders, either of their actual conditions or their effectiveness. An article in the Polish press declared point-blank that "in reality [the administration] sees no effective means of exerting educational influence over juvenile prison inmates under conditions of the existing system of penal institutions." According to this article, talks held with the inmates themselves indicated that they had not undergone any "change"; that their criminal attitude had in fact become more deeply entrenched during detention.

The article said that the attempt to solve this educational problem through isolated and uncoordinated measures such as work and vocational courses, organizing theatrical groups, etc., had had little effect.¹⁰

An institution cited as a model and acclaimed for its successes is the Sopoty Retreat in Poland. This is a reform school for girls, who, according to *Trybuna Ludu*, March 23, 1959, are thought to be more resistant to "re-education" than are boys. Educators and penologists, who consider it possible to salvage the most deeply demoralized boys, are inclined to "write off" girl delinquents.*

The key to the effectiveness of Sopoty, the paper said, is its recognition that the rehabilitation of girls, as compared to boys, cannot be accomplished only through teaching them a congenial trade or a skill. Girls are less easily interested in this, but are highly sensitive to their surroundings, and to the positive influence of "an atmosphere of beauty, order, and cleanliness." The staff at Sopoty helps the girls improve their diet and dress, develop aesthetic appreciation through dancing and music lessons.

In contrast, *Trybuna Ludu* cited a member of the staff at a girls' reformatory in Cerekwica who "described practically every other characteristic of the girls in her group as 'psychotic.' . . . What can you expect from such 'educators'? And they are legion in our reformatories!" commented the paper.

Prevention

Education is seen as not only the remedy but the chief prophylactic against juvenile delinquency; and the term is construed broadly to mean the moral, intellectual and political influence exercised over the younger generation by every kind of contact: family, school, youth organization, press, radio and movies.

Echoing similar sentiments in the West, the Communists are currently exhorting against slack discipline at home and in the schools. At the 1958 national conference of Hungarian teachers, a spokesman called for the development of "a new kind of Socialist awareness of responsibility for wrongdoing": "We freed the child from a certain unnecessary parental or adult authority, but we did not provide a substitute, and the undisciplined behavior of the children is now a matter of great concern. . . . Education is inconceivable without some degree of strictness [and] it is a matter of wonder that in recent years we have been ashamed of this word."⁹

The supervision of children of working parents in after-hours groups at the schools has also been something less than satisfactory: parents complain that the children "enrich their vocabulary in undesirable ways" and sometimes come home beaten and in tatters.¹⁰

The moral training of the younger generation is a key element in the prevention of juvenile crime. This is a former domain of the family and religious institutions which has been appropriated by the Party, except in Poland, where a considerable share of it has been re-

* According to this article, the number of delinquent girls is always five or six times smaller than that of boys. However, the rate of increase of crime among boys begins to taper off at age 25, while that among girls continues to climb uninterruptedly.

claimed by the Catholic Church. Elsewhere, ethics based on Church teachings are condemned as, at best, irrelevant, at worst, subversive, in a society officially based on "atheistic materialism." However, the Communist authorities have found that the moral lessons implicit in the Marxist-Leninist theory or slant taught in school courses are not "getting through."

An experimental year of ethical instruction was introduced in Hungarian middle schools in 1959. According to the headmaster of the Radnoti middle school in Szeged, interviewed in the Hungarian press, parents had requested this instruction because "although the pupils are made acquainted with questions of principle in the courses on

ideology and natural science, little is said about how to behave in life and about the criteria of good and bad for the Socialist individual." As a result, he said, many parents try to shape the character of children according to the old principles. The youngsters, however, regard these principles as outdated, but since they are "not sufficiently acquainted with the principle and practice of Communist morals they fall into an ambiguous position." The Szeged headmaster said that the students also had requested the courses in ethics. "In one of our polls the following question was raised by the students: what should a Socialist individual be like if he wants to live in accordance with the Marxist conception of life? The children expressed interest in learning

POLAND'S "COOL" GENERATION

from *SWIAT* (Warsaw), May 31, 1959

Here they are—motionless and passive behind cafe tables. In the past they wore beards and dirty sweaters, now they are a little more civilized on the outside, but inside they remain the same as before. They are finishing their studies at the university, or they are not finishing because they have resigned or been kicked out. They vegetate in cafes; not necessarily strictly cafes, sometimes it is a third-rate bar or an insignificant shop. . . . There are no apocalyptic drinking sprees in the [Marek] Hlasko vein—such excesses are committed only by a few who are not typical in this environment. It is not a matter of either demoralized or hooligan youth—they do not fit into any of those slots.

The themes of the conversations which take place at the cafe tables could be broken down in the following percentages of the time consumed: ways of making money, 25 percent; ways to travel abroad, 25 percent; jokes and empty abstract talk, 50 percent; political and other "serious" subjects, 00 percent. . . . Anybody who makes a serious remark throws a wet blanket on the conversation and gets nasty looks from all present. How, then, is it possible to learn anything about [these youth]? The method is to choose one individual, take him aside, and, having achieved an atmosphere of proper intimacy, conduct the interview:

"Do you read the newspapers?"

"Not much."

"Are you interested in any basic political or social problems?"

"There are no basic problems. It is all a pack of lies, according to the period."

"What periods do you mean? Have you known many?"

"Too many. There are ex-youth union members who have now been ordered to change their attitude for the third time. . . . We are creating our own period, our own ideology. . . ."

"And what is that?"

"To live decently, easily, without effort and upheavals. To travel somewhere . . . and work just enough to survive. . . ."

"Why have so many of you abandoned your studies?"

"Studies are nonsense. You become a doctor, for instance, and they send you to the provinces; we want to stay in the city. In Warsaw. Here is the only possible life. Besides, people with unfinished studies make just as much money—look at the car-owners! Most of them are simply dumb oafs. . . . What do we live on? Hard to say; everyone manages. Let's see—a painter needs slaves [as models]. We are slaves. Philologists use our translations. Our girl friends get extra parts in films. And so on."

Various things have led people to the exclusive world of the "passive ones": personal disappointments, unhappy love affairs, a hopeless financial situation, lack of prospects after gaining a diploma, the fall of one idol or another. They have come here from right and left. What unites them, then? Only one thing, it seems: an overpowering, indescribable weariness.

Their attitude can be understood thus: "Just let me alone! . . . I, the common man, am told to live enthralled, be delighted with everything, admire something new all the time. . . . Too many impressions! This becomes a bore. The tasks before me are always 'great' or 'sublime' or 'exceptional'—and I haven't the strength. The older generations are more used to this and take it better. The youngsters care nothing and take it better still. Let us lock ourselves up in this cafe. Here, at least, is peace."

This is a picture of the life of youth. Shall we rise and make a great mobilizing speech? Those bent over a glass of "diuretic" beer cannot bear high-falutin' speech-making. They will simply not listen. . . . What tone of voice, what persuasion should we use, then, to reach them?

about love, friendship, family life . . . the difference between religious and Communist morals. . . ."

The headmaster concluded that the ethics instruction has greatly strengthened morale and discipline in the schools. As a result of it the pupils are trying, in and outside of school, "to behave in a way befitting the Socialist man."***

Youth Organizations

A central role in the control of delinquency is assigned to the regime youth organizations. In fact, these are probably the least influential of all the forces focussed on youth. Criticized, boycotted, and, at the crucial moment, scuttled by their own members (in Poland and Hungary in 1956), there is little to suggest that they have succeeded in gaining a real hold in recent years. Part of their job is to organize wholesome entertainment—parties, sports, excursions—which will deflect members from the forbidden pleasures of jitterbugging and carousing. This they have notoriously failed to do. But their main function in the fight against juvenile delinquency is to influence straying members by a specific technique of pressure and persuasion. The youth press regularly publishes "case histories" of young miscreants rescued from the downward path by the collective efforts of the youth organization leaders, often at the request of distraught parents.

A writer in the Bulgarian press said that it was the duty of the youth league organizations "not to expel the hooligans in their midst but to convert them." A characteristic case of conversion and redemption by the youth league was written up by one youth, Gheorgi Dumitrescu, in the Bucharest *Scinteia Tineretului*, November 21, 1959: "My mother complained to the Youth Organization Committee about my behavior. Then the Committee Secretary scolded me for my mistakes and at the same time showed me what ought to be my attitude toward life and my work. . . . With the help of the collective I succeeded in understanding everything that was backward and bourgeois in myself; and after that, I joined wholeheartedly in the common struggle of my generation to build Socialism in our country."

CONCLUSION

WHILE ON MANY LEVELS there is a common approach in East and West to the problem of juvenile delinquency, the philosophies of the long-range guidance of youth are quite different. The Western approach, for good

or ill, is essentially a conservative one: emphasis is on correcting the "slippage" in traditional standards and institutions—the home, the church and the school—whose basic worth is not questioned but whose hold over youth has been jarred loose by the strains and changes of the "atomic age." The Communist solution has nothing to do with the Church, little to do with the family, but seeks to instill a new code, respect for a new set and scale of institutions—the plant or farm "collective," the Party, the country.

The Polish paper *Sztandar Młodych* (Warsaw), November 14, 1959, countering criticism from the West of the regime's efforts to enlist Polish youth in its economic programs, cited the high rate of juvenile delinquency in the West, adding that "the matter is really too painful to allow us to rejoice that the other side is in trouble. After all, it is no secret that hooliganism and juvenile delinquency are causing worry in our country also, and that although we are following another road [system], we also want to fight these symptoms. Of course nobody overlooks the positive influence of family life on the education and character of future citizens, but we want to engage these young people in the [Socialist] transformation of our country, and we consider this one of the decisive factors in the shaping of the human and civic attitude."

The unchanging need of youth everywhere is for freedom from arbitrary restraints and an opportunity to find a place in society for which their talents and interests are suited. In modern Western society, youth has relative freedom but little sense of social destiny; in totalitarian society, the first is absent and the second illusory.

That the youth of Eastern Europe eagerly rise to the opportunity for real, constructive social action was demonstrated during the 1955-56 years, particularly by the development of the "young intelligentsia clubs" in Poland. These were not political organizations, but were devoted to debates on national problems and to community projects such as literary and art "evenings," city improvement plans, etc. But they were suppressed when the Gomulka regime reasserted Party control over public life. The centralization and monopolization of all decision and power in the Soviet bloc, and the lack of incentives which might inspire youth to improve at least their immediate surroundings, induces in them a feeling of futility. Despite the Communist cry for the "active engagement" of youth in public life, what is really wanted of them is a kind of passivity—passive acceptance of the role delimited and assigned to them by authority.

FOOTNOTES FOR THIS ARTICLE

¹ *PRACE* (Prague), October 22, 1957

² *MAGYAR NEMZET* (Budapest), January 28, 1959

³ *NEPSZABADSAG* (Budapest), October 29, 1959

⁴ *MAGYAR NEMZET* (Budapest), February 10, 1960

⁵ *PANSTWO I PRAWO* (Warsaw), August 1956

⁶ *RADIO WARSAW*, February 21, 1960

⁷ *PO PROSTU* (Warsaw), December 1955

⁸ *ZYCIE WARSZAWY* (Warsaw), December 10-18, 1955

⁹ *NEPSZABADSAG* (Budapest), January 24, 1958


¹⁰ *PRZEGLAD KULTURALNY* (Warsaw), May 28, 1959

¹¹ *NARODNA MLADEJ* (Sofia), February 26, 1960

* Regrettably, the exact precepts taught in these courses were not revealed. However, it is possible to deduce the general line. Right conduct for the lay "Socialist" man (the Party hierarchy is subject to a somewhat different and sterner code) would presumably consist, first of all, in love of labor (especially manual labor) expressed in suitable action; then, in unremitting combativity toward the "class enemy," and the cultivation of a "collective" rather than a personal allegiance (thus justifying, for example, the police informer). Little stress is laid on the passive virtues such as compassion, forbearance—with the major exception of obedience—or on abstract virtues. Loyalty and service, for example, must always be judged in terms of for what and against what.

** On the other hand, a Warsaw grammar school headmaster interviewed in *Przegląd Kulturalny* said that courses in "practical ethics" in his school had been a failure. (*Polish Perspectives* [Warsaw], August-September 1959.)

First of two articles.
The author, J. H.,
is a student of Polish philosophy.



The scholar cowering in his lair of knowledge.

POLITYKA (Warsaw), April 2, 1960

Philosophy in Poland

PHILOSOPHY PLAYS A rather unusual role in the Communist world. Among the most striking characteristics of Leninism—as one of the possible interpretations of Marxism—is the conviction that the entire ideological structure rests on, and is derivable from, a specific philosophical system. This is why so much attention is given to doctrinal purity in most technical philosophical matters; this explains why political disagreements are always traced back to alleged differences in philosophical views (e.g. Trotsky or Bukharin); and why the teaching of “correct” philosophy is considered to be so tremendously important. This insistence on the political relevance of even the most technical philosophical doctrines—so strongly emphasized by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*—led over the years to a peculiar reversal of functions. Instead of a “correct” philosophy determining politics, it was the “correct” politics which assumed control of philosophy. In other words, philosophy became too important to be left in the hands of philosophers. As a result, philosophy in the Soviet Union, and after the second World War in Eastern Europe, developed under conditions entirely unknown to Western philosophical circles.

This reversal of the roles of philosophy and politics as originally conceived by Marxism, soon reduced philosophical writing to a state of dogmatism and monotonous repetition. The stage of “pseudo-theology,” when Marxism was transformed into a vast system of justification and rationalization of current political policies, was reached in the Soviet Union in the early Thirties, and in most countries of Eastern Europe in the late Forties.

There was, however, one exception to this rule. In Poland the development of philosophy took a different course, with the result that in the last few years many interesting works have been produced there by both Marxist and non-Marxist philosophers. Perhaps the most interesting feature of contemporary philosophical writing in Poland is the

partial interpenetration of various Western philosophical trends with dialectical materialism (understood in a “non-theological” way). With few exceptions, such as Lukacs in Hungary and Bloch in East Germany, Poland seems to be the only country in Eastern Europe where original and significant contributions to Marxism have been made. In addition, despite certain recent changes in the Gomulka regime’s policies, many non-Marxist philosophers have been able to publish works of lasting importance.

Polish philosophy, as it developed after the Second World War, deserves attention because of its scholarly achievements and as a symptom of the changing political picture. The following remarks are intended to present a general picture of philosophical trends in Poland, with the reservation that this complex subject cannot be thoroughly covered within the limits of an article.

The postwar history of philosophy in Poland may be divided—like Polish political history—into three periods. The first was the period of attempts to reconstruct Polish philosophy after the damages of the war and the German occupation. The second, later euphemistically called “the past period,” or simply “the period,” was that of the unbridled rule of Stalinist orthodoxy. The third, starting after the “thaw,” or more specifically after October 1956, was characterized by the revival of independent traditional schools of philosophy and the appearance of Polish “revisionism.”

Reconstruction and Debate

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WAR, Poland became the scene of an encounter between the older philosophical traditions and the imported official State philosophy of the Soviet Union. The resulting conflict was officially described—in the usual Communist oversimplification—as a struggle between “materialism” and “idealism.” In fact,

the nature of the conflict was quite different. To clarify this matter it is necessary to add a few comments about the two conflicting parties, i.e., the Polish philosophical tradition on the one hand, and the philosophy of dialectical materialism on the other.

The Polish philosophical tradition, like that of Western Europe, was not homogeneous. Philosophy was taken to be an autonomous rational inquiry which endeavored to establish its conclusions on the basis of relevant evidence rather than on the whims or preferences of religious or political authorities. On the questions of "relevant evidence," proper methods of philosophical inquiry, the range of philosophically solvable problems, etc., there were in Poland, as everywhere in the West, many far-reaching divergencies of opinion. Although Poland had produced significant philosophers as early as the 13th century, and Polish imitators of Hegel had achieved their most spectacular results in metaphysical system-building in the 19th century, most historians would certainly agree that the period between the two world wars was the most productive and brilliant period in the history of Polish philosophy.

The Influence of Twardowski

This, to a large extent, was the result of the influence and personal example of an extraordinary teacher of philosophy—Kazimierz Twardowski of the University of Lwow. The most eminent professors of philosophy in Poland between the wars were Twardowski's students, and he was often considered the spiritual father of what is sometimes called the "Lwow-Warsaw" school of philosophy. But this group of philosophers, who were predominant in the Polish universities, did not form a "school" in the usual meaning of the term. They were not linked by a common allegiance to certain specific doctrines, but rather shared a certain general attitude which could and did lead to divergent philosophical positions. Their approach to philosophical inquiry was characterized by a rejection of all types of dogmatism and irrationalism, a programmatic striving for maximum clarity and precision of expression, a great attention to the problems of language, a distrust of grandiose but nebulous and irresponsible philosophical speculation, and a profound belief in the philosophical relevance of the methods of symbolic logic developed in the 20th century. To use the comparison recently made popular by Isaiah Berlin, Twardowski's pupils were, on the whole, on the side of the intellectual "foxes" rather than of the intellectual "hedgehogs." They preferred the "reason of Ulysses," as exemplified by mathematics and empirical science, to the "reason of Plato" as understood by most metaphysical system-builders in the history of philosophy. They preferred to know many small, well established things than to look for an ultimate key to all the riddles of the universe. Although there are many similarities between this approach and the attitude of the Vienna Circle, most Polish philosophers of this group were not logical positivists.

It is only natural that in this climate of opinion much attention was paid to logic, which—as is well known—entered a new period of development at the turn of the cen-

tury. Polish contributions to the new field of symbolic logic made Poland one of the most important international centers of research in logic, semantics and the philosophy of mathematics. The names of the leading Polish logicians: Lukasiewicz, Lesniewski, Tarski (now at the University of California in Berkeley) and of their numerous pupils, became familiar to philosophers and mathematicians all over the world. Among the philosophers who made extensive use of the new logical and semantic tools in their research, the two most influential were T. Kotarbinski, who developed a variety of materialism called "reism" or "concretism," and K. Ajdukiewicz who represented radical conventionalism. An entire new generation of younger scholars was brought up under the influence of these teachers. Irrespective of doctrinal differences, all of them were deeply committed to the ethos of free rational inquiry, and resolutely opposed to all those forms of authoritarianism, dogmatism and irresponsible speculation which often pass for philosophy.


Although this general attitude was predominant in Polish prewar philosophy, other movements and other approaches also had their representatives. To the aforementioned Warsaw logicians, the names of L. Chwistek and J. Sleszynski of Cracow should be added. Roman Ingarden—also a former student of Twardowski and later of Husserl—represented phenomenology. His numerous works on aesthetics, philosophy of literature, theory of knowledge and ontology, published both in Polish and in German, placed him among the foremost European representatives of this philosophical school. The group of neo-Thomists was also very active, and one of the interesting developments within this group was an attempt to apply the new logical and semantic techniques to Thomistic philosophy.

Philosophy and the State

These rather cursory remarks are intended to suggest what was implied in "the Polish philosophical tradition." There was no single, homogeneous tradition but a variety of trends, linked by allegiance to the fundamental principles of free rational inquiry. The conflict between in-

Problems are getting bigger.

POLITYKA (Warsaw), March 12, 1960



dependent Polish philosophers and the Leninist version of Marxism was, therefore, not a conflict between "materialism" and "idealism." It was not a conflict between differing views *within* philosophy, because the nature of the conflict was determined by the nature of dialectical materialism.

The term "dialectical materialism" is ambiguous. It may refer to two superficially similar, but in fact very different, things. The term "dialectical materialism" may be taken to mean a certain system of philosophy which is an original combination of naturalism and Hegelianism. Dialectical materialism in this sense must be presented for acceptance on rational grounds, and enters the competition with other world-views on the same terms as any other philosophy. Its chances of survival under rational scrutiny are—as in the case of most other philosophies—a controversial matter. The claim that dialectical materialism provides the logical basis for a certain type of social and political program, and the only possible basis for such a program, is itself open for investigation. However this matter may stand, whether dialectical materialism is true or false, whether it determines the validity of the political and economic program of Communism or not, the logical status of this theory does not differ from that of other philosophies.

However, the term "dialectical materialism" is also used to refer to the official State philosophy of the Soviet Union. In this case the term means, despite appearances, something entirely different. It is something different because if the decisions of political authorities become the ultimate criterion of truth in philosophical questions, we are dealing not with philosophy in the usually accepted sense of the term but with a theological, or rather pseudo-theological, theory. The development of philosophy in the Soviet Union moved steadily away from dialectical materialism in the first sense toward dialectical materialism in the second, theological, sense. The causes of this transformation cannot be analyzed here, but they were intimately linked with the transformation of the function of Marxism in the Soviet Union, which was in turn connected with the transformation of the Soviet social system itself.

It should be noted that the somewhat dubious philosophical attractiveness of dialectical materialism in the first sense is often used to gain converts to dialectical materialism in the second sense. This pattern can be seen in operation in the early postwar history of philosophy in Poland. Although dialectical materialism was declared to be the official philosophy of the ruling party and the guiding light on the road to "Socialism," this was still a period of relative freedom of expression. Dialectical materialism was supposed to triumph in the normal competition of the "free market" of ideas.

Postwar Writing

During this first period much was done to revive the prewar traditions of Polish philosophy described above. The old well-known philosophical periodicals were revived (*Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Studia Philosophica*), the teaching of philosophy was resumed by well-qualified teachers, and many efforts were made to



The choice of weapons depends on the type of enemy.

POLITYKA (Warsaw), March 19, 1960

establish broken contacts with Western philosophy. Łukasiewicz and Tarski remained abroad, but Kotarbinski, Ajdukiewicz, Czeżowski, Ingarden, Tatarkiewicz and many others were active in Poland.

In the field of logic, in addition to many short, technical papers, there appeared several originally conceived textbooks (T. Kotarbinski *Logic for Law Students*, T. Czeżowski *Logic*, A. Mostowski *Mathematical Logic*). The last book remains today one of the best presentations of the subject in the world literature. In ethics, Maria Ossowska published two major studies: *Introduction to the Science of Ethics*, and *Motives of Human Behavior*. R. Ingarden published the first two volumes of a monumental study of the problem of idealism and realism (*The Dispute as to the Existence of the World*, 1947, 1948), and a volume of papers devoted to the philosophy of literature. S. Ossowski's *Foundations of Aesthetics* appeared in a second, slightly revised, edition. Toward the end of the period, W. Tatarkiewicz's *History of Philosophy* appeared in a new, three-volume edition. The third volume, entirely new, devoted to contemporary philosophy, is perhaps the most complete and best written work of this sort in any language. However, it was never put on sale—the situation in philosophy was already changing. The same author also wrote a book *On Happiness*, 1947. K. Ajdukiewicz's *Problems and Schools of Philosophy*, published in the same period (1949), is much more than a simple introduction to philosophy and shows certain changes from the earlier views of the author. Ajdukiewicz, a master of concise and penetrating philosophical essays, also published many important short papers on a variety of subjects. The neo-

(Continued inside back cover)

"And On And On"

Excerpts from the poem by
ALEXANDER TVARDOVSKY

The publication in Moscow of the complete version of a long poem by Alexander Tvardovsky has caused a considerable stir. A major section of the work deals with Stalin, a subject which, despite the Twentieth Congress, is less than common in Soviet letters these days. The poet is extremely critical of the dead dictator; Stalin is given credit for great efforts in the war, but in other respects is branded an egomaniac despot.

The poem (which appeared in the April 29 and May 1 issues of Moscow's PRAVDA, as well as in the May issue of the monthly Novy Mir) is in three sections. The first, subtitled "Towards the End of the Road," is largely travelogue, describing the greatness of the Motherland. The last, subtitled "To New Distances," is the poet talking to his readers of their cheerful future. It is the middle section, subtitled, "This Is How it Was," and roughly half the poem, that contains the criticism of Stalin. Some of this is reprinted below. The translation is a literal one; no effort has been made to capture the poetic qualities of the work.

WHEN within the Kremlin walls,
Alive, from life protected,
He was like a menacing spirit above us,
We knew no other name.

We wondered how further to glorify
Him in village and town.
Here nothing is to be subtracted,
Nothing added—
This is how it was in the land.

* * *

This is how it was: For a quarter century,
As the call to struggle and labor,
There sounded the name of a man
Ranking with the words Native Land.

Without the least moderation
It even assumed the rights
Which among people of deep faith
Are given to the name of the deity.

And it was simply the custom
That he, through a puff of pipe smoke,
Saw everything in the world himself
And managed everything like god;

That those hands stretched out
To all the world's main activities,
To all production, any science,
To the sea's depths and to the stars.

And complete, incalculable account of everything
Had already been taken—of what and why;
And even a dead hero
Was obliged to him for fame.

And those who marched together at the start,
Who knew the underground and prison,
Who seized power and fought—
They descended to the shadows, one by one.

Who to the shadow, who to the sun—the list is long—
To the ranks of prematurely old men.
Soon Kalinin entertained
No callers over Kremlin tea.

And these were fully under ban,
And those were long since gone,
And where to hang which portrait
Was settled for an age ahead.

So over the land he lived and ruled
Holding the reins in a tight hand.

And who did not praise him in his presence,
Who did not extol—find one such!

Significantly, perhaps, a son of the East,
He showed in the end those features
Of his narrow, his cruel
Injustice
And justice.

But which of us is ready to judge—
To decide who is right and who is guilty?
People are the subject here, and people,
Do they not themselves create their gods?

Were not we the singers of the honorary theme
Who thoughtlessly informed the world
That even the very poem about him
He had himself put in our mouths?

Were there not those who all, in the ceremonial hall,
Not letting him even open his lips,
Stood up and exclaimed:

—Hoorah! He'll be right again . . .
Again he will be right . . .

And if the experiment went awry,
Who could be reproached?
The great Lenin was not a god,
And did not teach god-making.

Whom to reproach? The country, the State,
Through severe, laborious ways of work
Held the glory of that name
Atop the towers of peaceful buildings.

And the courage of Russian fighters
Carried it from the Volga bank
To the black walls of the Reichstag
In the hot shadows of gun barrels . . .

My contemporary, friend and schoolmate,
Who was but a boy in October days
Comrade of a youth not ill-spent
With whom once one walked together —

Did not we, sons of daring exploits,
A land called to sacrifices,
Carry that name-banner in our hearts
According to five-year plans?

And we knew, in the dangers of the march,
That the true banners were
Not us alone, but the flower of the nation,
The honor and mind of the whole country.

We called him—we begin to be sly! —
Father of the nation-family.
Here nothing is to be subtracted,
Nothing added —
This is how it was in the land.

This was a father whose least word
Whose least flick of the brow
Was law. Do your stern duty
And if it is wrong,
Say it is right. . . .

Our odes did not sing
Of the evil time when, despising law,
He could bring down his supreme anger
On an entire people

* * *

But when we came to test our fate
There was, however, some worth
In the inflexibility of the paternal will,
With which we, on the field of war,
Met the enemy in the bitter hour.

And in front of Moscow and in the Urals —
In labor, deprivation and struggle —
We had confidence in that will,
No less than in ourselves.

We went with him, to save peace
To defend life against death.
Here nothing is to be subtracted,
Nothing added —
You remember it all, my native land.

Was it not the power of far-reaching thought
That showed us we must move
The country's industrial outpost
Fearlessly to the east —
And not defend another's supplies,
Having the distance in view . . .

And with a terrible voice
In battle thundered our steel.

And it would have been futile for us to undertake
To persuade the world in other days
That the name of Stalin
To this steel
And to this distance, was not akin.

To him, who led us in battle and knew
What the approaching days would bring,
We are all indebted for victory,
As he is also indebted to us.

* * *

Salute!
And again, a five-year plan.
And all for the radiance of that snug crown.
He already frequently referred to himself
In the third person.

Now in that Kremlin cell
And in the new glitter of ancient halls
From his old man's body
He saw himself as separate.

His greatness for all the ages,
Which all our chorus promised him,
Among other things he wished
To see for himself during his lifetime.

He hurried.
And everything seemed small.

The Volga had already been joined to the Don,
 Moscow stood towering
 Like any foreign pavillion. . .
 Of a canal
 It was not enough
 That it be visible from Mars!

* * *

That was the border of the forbidden zone,
 Where the entrance is closed to the dead,
 Where a guard of sleepless vigilance
 Grew in the granite at the gate. . .

And looking at life on that evening
 Who could even dream
 That in the Kremlin itself no one was eternal
 And that for everyone the time comes. . .

But Tsar cannon did not fire
 Tsar bell did not ring out in the night
 When, at the appointed hour, that Old Man
 Fitted his keys
 In all the doors, locks, bolts,
 Not tripping the clever alarms,
 And along the Kremlin corridors
 Came in to him without a pass.

He entered the room without a knock,
 Hardly with a noticeable sign —
 And science departed,
 Turning the matter over to the Old Man.

The night broke, blue showed at the window
 From behind the closed curtains.
 And he remained alone with him
 Alone
 With death — for one.

There it was, and yet, how differently —
 For us, for the world, it was not simply that
 That day had come, that line had been drawn,
 And we were long behind that line. . .

As they say, when you have not seen your father off
 On his last journey,
 You are still a sort of child,
 Though your beard may be long on your chest.

Your father's thoughts are still in view,
 And his power and long experience —
 But when he goes — suddenly
 You have your youthfulness no longer.

Thus we, not in literary talk, but in fact,
 When fate shook us,
 We all, as it were, grew older —
 Nay, grew up — in that hour.

In silent formation on the day of loss
 We trooped into the Columned Hall,
 The hall where once upon a time he
 Stood by Lenin's bier.

He stood with bowed head, calmly
 His right hand on his breast.
 And those years of building and war —
 All that was still ahead.

All those dates, landmarks, and periods
 That have marked our fate,
 And that day, so far distant,
 When we would see him in his grave.

In these memorable minutes
 At the terrible father's funeral feast
 We became fully answerable
 For everything in the world —
 To the end.

And we did not take fright on the road,
 Passing this difficult turn,
 That now people and not gods
 Are appointed to look ahead.

There — whether they are good or bad —
 The way forward will show
 And to an epoch in full swing
 You'll not cry "Wait!"

You will not enter into quibbles with her
 When she's thundering on her way.

Time does not stop
 It only changes.

THE POET

Alexander Trifonovich Tvardovsky was born in 1910 in a village in the region of Smolensk. He began writing poetry as a child. During the great collectivization he broke off with his family; his father was sent to Siberia. He became a Party member in 1940. By 1954 three and a half million copies of his works — poetry, stories, sketches — had been published. In 1956 he was a signer of an open letter to French writers answering their protest against the suppression of the Hungarian Revolt. Tvardovsky is a member of the presidium of the Union of Soviet Writers; he has been awarded three Stalin Prizes (1941, 1946, 1947) and the Order of Lenin (1939).



Jests°

by MAGDA LEJA

This story by the young Polish writer Magda Leja appeared in Nowa Kultura (Warsaw), February 28, 1960. Using a fluid, refractive, experimental technique, it tells of a girl in a bleak provincial town who finds her life bearable only through the memories of an old love affair. Accused of dishonesty in her job, she flees like a sleepwalker to Warsaw and to the arms of her former lover. In the confusion of the city, and the trivial sophistication of her new acquaintances, she soon realizes that her hope of escape and her dream of love were only the illusions of inexperience.

SHE WALKED HOME ALONE, although they all lived nearby, on the only street of this community or suburb. A young woman in a light-blue raincoat which rustled inanimately and had cracked on the surface into a multitude of darker lines, like a celluloid wrapping. The unsteady beam

of streetlights above among the luxuriant tree branches illumined her face again and again, a face soft and helplessly exerted, as if the woman were attempting to concentrate her thoughts knowing in advance she could not and that maybe it wasn't even necessary, arrested in undefined effort and completely in its possession, so much so that an observant passerby would wonder how she could simultaneously walk in such a decisive manner not forgetting, from time to time, to arrange the parcels she carried in a white plastic basket. But the evening was late and the cool wind had also played its role—no one came from the direction of the one-story houses standing by the road and the people coming from the factory, if they looked at the blue coat at all, had no intention of looking at the girl's face, that was understandable. She heard the gates creak as they were saying their goodbyes, one after the other, almost without words, going into their apartments which they would leave in the morning to creak an even shorter

version of the same greeting and join their friends. In the light of the street lanterns she saw the peeling remnants of serene colored paint which had been permitted to age, not so much because the people were careless, as poor. Two men dissolved into the darkness of a yard and a moment later a rectangle of light outlined neatly arranged plants on the flower bed, growing low, and the wind in passing did not even touch them—so fragile and two-dimensional. There was no one in front of her now and from behind the wind brought sounds of last returning steps, but she knew that they would neither catch up with her nor pass her, because there was no reason for it, and she walked rather quickly, though not hurriedly, because she had no premonition and always walked that way. She thought: *Two roads, no, one road, going this way and back, this way and back. It shouldn't be, it shouldn't be as if nothing else existed*—realizing at the same time that such thinking brought her neither nearer nor farther away, because she would not have been able to answer the question what, in her opinion, should exist besides these houses in their yards (some of them housed shops and one a movie theatre) and these factories, she did not even know how to ask herself this question, she only felt it was very close, very possible and very important. She was once taught, and although she did not attach much importance to it, she remembered how it should have been: twisted ropes with everyone pulling according to his strength and in his direction, and, anyway, she had read about them in the newspapers. But now she thought, *it shouldn't be*, because just about an hour ago her strength had not proved enough and yet, not so much so that she would want to forget—that did not even enter into the picture—just like that other knowledge, neither denied, nor capable of constituting repeal, threaded by the years into feeling, rather than comprehension. She thought also: *If I don't find anything, if there is nothing besides this road, then I can only wait for defeat. But that's impossible.* She thought: *impossible*, just as if she had thought: *I?*—she understood nothing, she made nothing separately, except her own fate and that had been directed to her by dignity, a good fate. She put the basket on the steps, and drawing toward her with her left hand the door carelessly hinged in its frame, searched for the key, *It's begun and that means it is. Nothing can change that and if I, myself, stand next to it, no. . . .* A radio played in the house, but she was still much too preoccupied for surprise. Only when she had taken off her coat and begun arranging on the table the things she had bought before the meeting did she take any notice of the music, and even then she first told herself: *the Kubiks bought a radio*—in a tone of serene and indifferent approval, before she heard the song which had greeted her at the door and was just now coming to an end:

This table is
Veronica's table,
this corner is
Veronica's corner,
this gesture is
exactly her gesture.

She sat down on the bed, straight and stiff, holding in her hands a bag of sugar and an empty string bean jar, she sat like that for quite some time—without a thought, without a smile, afterwards she returned to the objects strewn across the table. *My name is Veronica.*

She heard, one after the other, muffled bangs on the wall. Following one of them the radio was silenced and the Kubiks began an indistinct quarrel. Suddenly:

"The hell with him!" she yelled and the radio once again roared into melody. But only for a short while; Veronica did not need to listen nor guess to know that the Kubiks were scuffling next to the newly-bought radio. Something fell to the floor with a piercing, metallic sound and Potelski, or maybe his wife, again banged on the wall. Mrs. Kubik was now enumerating all the excellent matches she could have made if she hadn't fallen in love to her own undoing and misery; Potelski was Kubik's foreman, that too, Veronica did not have to think about. She was eating her supper, sitting sideways at a table littered with old magazines, and darkness, wedged into the window panes like skyscraping water, reflected her thoughtful face, paler and smaller than in reality. Unseen trees rustled at the edge of the community's only street. She did not look at their reflection, just as she did not listen to their growing music, but they were within her now when she tried to remember the song, these few tones, few words which she had managed to catch, but which eluded her as if they could exist only in this way, at arm's length, a step away. *If that is his song*, she thought and everything stopped within her with the sudden reflex of self-preservation; and it was then that it came from the unknown nooks of memory: "I listen for steps, maybe it's you, if I'm not home, the key is downstairs, as always. So take it and come," and right away: *So something else does exist. So I'm not alone*, and beneath it all the thought: *I knew, I knew that I'm right*, as faltering as the efforts of the first bird of dawn. Slowly, she drew out the many pins in her hair, black strands fell on her bare shoulders; now she was looking at her reflection. She looked, taking more time than she needed to prepare for bed. Suddenly trembling seized her, she ran barefoot toward the switch, put out the light and jumped into bed.

Through the murmur of trees filling the room, perhaps it was a dream, dark, turbulent water, late at night she had time to think one more thought: *Now I'll wait for the song*, and smile before she slept.

After that she smiled all the time; and under the station clock these smiles looked like shining leaves strewn the length of that single, twice-daily traversed street. At two in the afternoon she was buying *Trybuna* at the gate newsstand and jostled—involuntarily slowing her steps—she studied the radio programs, suddenly to look ahead of her, above the news pages—the workers her eyes encountered shifted their gaze with incomprehensible embarrassment. Everyone, of course, knew who she was and about that meeting the other night and perhaps they associated these facts with some other, previous ones, if indeed, similar situations had occurred, *they must have occurred*, she thought, and: *they thought me stupid when I smiled—*



Magda Leja is one of the most prominent of the newest generation of Polish writers. The critic Jan Blonski, discussing her work in Przegląd Kulturalny (Warsaw), March 17, 1960, said: "Magda Leja sketches portraits of 'emancipated' women. This emancipation, however, is peculiar and only partial. These girls, usually young, have broken with the rigorous morals expressed by their environment and suffer not so much for lack but for excess of experience. They attack men boldly, but complain that they are unable to find a constant object of affection. They feel free only again to become dependent upon a man in whom they find the key to their own 'I.'"

SZTANDAR MŁODYCH (Warsaw), March 4, 1960

an involuntary smile shaped her lips, a young man, sitting on a bench near by, winked at her invitingly, but she didn't notice. *And yet, I was right. Not because I'm going to Lutek now, to Warsaw, not at all. That was simply the best way of living through it. Because, finally, I knew how little I hold in my hands.* Some sort of protest welled up in her: *I knew?*—but she crased it, that wasn't important any more, how much awareness and how much instinct. Microphones on all the stations were repeating Lutek's song and she preferred to reminisce rather than think.

Bent over the reagent-smear table, her hands following work known well enough so as not to require her entire attention, but sufficiently interesting to provide satisfaction, she smiled defiantly and mockingly, as if she had escaped from the circle of ominous desks through an unseen crack, into freedom, freedom of action. Only her work was checked each day, personally, by the directress, only she had been reprimanded, although none of the other girls in the laboratory wore head covering, she always answered respectfully and with a serene, stubborn smile which she could not chase away even if she wanted to and the supervisors turned their eyes which expressed something else than embarrassment. *How long did it last? I don't know myself, I'd have to count,* automatically, she took a step forward and moved the small oil-cloth valise—the move brought a strand of hair across her face—to look at the face of the clock. A breathless woman, holding a baby, rushed out of the tunnel and looked around the platform in panic before she realized and wiped the perspiration off her brow after putting down the child. The train was late. The young man was eating plums and spitting the pits in front of him and looking stubbornly at Veronica all the while. She patted her hair, *ah, no, it's not for you I'm smiling* and it was a very pleasant and sad thought—much-encompassing and short-lived.

She listened to the radio at the Kubiks. Mrs. Kubik was not surprised at this sudden interest and hinging her hands on her formless belly said in tones of unconvincing self-pity:

"One thousand eight hundred it cost us."

"But you won't have to sing to the baby now," answered Veronica prettily, which immediately evoked a long mono-

logue full of pauses, exclamation points and confidential, mouth-to-ear whispers. *And it still happened that I half-smiled, as if through mist, as if I were suddenly stupefied, that was when I remembered Lutek. Poor Mrs. Kubik said: "You're not even listening to me," and I . . .* She felt the warm surge of the scene: Lutek raises his head suddenly looking straight into her eyes; she could reconstruct his every movement (there exists a special calculus of reminiscence), but she had never had so much fun and that which encompassed her entirely—the girl with the oil-cloth valise standing on a station platform—was closer to becoming a repeat performance of the previous reality than the scene itself, more easily adaptable to description with the aid of abstract words than any others, if there ever were to occur the annoying necessity for oral description. Because she was capable of calculating that movement, his gaze, in tiniest detail, she did not do it, she couldn't see any reason for it since she immediately knew its meaning and felt—as she had years before—that engulfing confidence in the course of events, spanned as they were by the serene bridge of his gaze.

"Rail workers! improve your qualifications," suggested the p.a. system and without so much as a pause the overdue Warsaw train was coming into the station.

Suddenly the platform became populated with a score of agitated persons. The young man crushed his paper bag, now empty of plums, and tossed it under the wheels of the locomotive. Veronica picked up her valise, someone pushed her, the child yelled and the act of boarding became commemorated by a dark, oblong mark on her calf which she did not see at the time.

After a rainy day, dusk had muddled the chaotic panorama of cottages and for just one fleeting moment metallic pots of geraniums swayed in relief against the lights which bloomed no one knows when until the train leaped from the embrace of roofs straight into open fields.

On that other station, when they said goodbye three years ago, one of the two white handkerchiefs quickly became soaked with tears. The warm dampness of the tightly clutched kerchief had remained intact, alive, *as if it were the very nucleus of what I felt*, thought Veronica with amazement.

"I know you from somewhere."

"Could be."

And that voice in the microphone, with its Lowow accent. . . . After that she didn't cry any more and thought of Lutek very seldom, she flirted with other boys, almost married once and experienced no conflict whatever between her everyday behavior and the certainty of return, sufficiently complete not to need thinking about or confirmation through reminiscence. It was as if her union with Lutek, by the nature of its existence, could not be terminated by anything, not even that other leave taking, only suspended, a secondary factor, recognizing no obstacles, no matter how difficult it might prove to imagine practically. But that will-be was enough for her instead of imagination and because she always left the first step up to him she waited, herself only half realizing it, and awareness did not mar her feelings with any speculation or nervousness.

"How far are you going?"

"Warsaw."

"And are you going to stand all night? So long as we're talking time goes by quickly, but I get off soon, three stops."

In Biale Konskie an extravagantly dressed group of travelers rushed the car, windows were thrown open violently:

"Heniek, let's have the bag, here, here we are!"

"Let me go, Bunny, Frank, hold me, after all, I have to tell him something. Oh, oh, it's moving. . . ."

Some character, fat as a tank, rolled through the aisle, to and fro, waking passengers sleeping in their seats.

"It's scandalous," he declared. "Two compartments. All the rest reserved. Scandalous!"

"Are these two full? Let's see."

"Packed."

"It really is scandalous"—said the young man to Veronica, the one who got off at the third stop. Just then a thin, thirteen-year-old boy came out of one of the reserved compartments, looked around and moved towards the washroom. Sighing, a huge blonde shifted her bulk to let him pass. Veronica did not join the conversation: *they don't know anything either, they don't suspect me of anything*, she thought, but she felt no more festive or unusual than if she were traveling to the Province officer to replenish the laboratory's exhausted chemical supplies. Lutek asked that she return and she was returning, to her this was a normal course of events, the only consequence, and no one can be surprised when life goes on normally. Not she; in her opinion she was doing only normal things, even last evening, when talking publicly about falsifying analyses results, she did not give in to concealed desperation of ambition, and perhaps this approach to her actions as the most ordinary in the world, even though no one else might act in the same way, had constructed the wall of security surrounding her.

"Unfortunately, I must get off now," said the young man. She gave him her hand. The attention-compelling group quieted down a little, but still continued intangibly to underscore its separateness from the submissive rest of the passengers. The blonde sat down on her valise and

one of the men bent over and whispered something into her ear, pointing toward Veronica with his eyes, but the blonde shook her head negatively. The fat one said: "And they're asleep. That's not even educational."

In the compartment, under the dimmed, greenish lights, children swayed inertly on the benches.

My valise is too flimsy to sit on, thought Veronica, *I don't stuff it enough*, and with slight apprehension listed in her mind all the things she had taken with her, there weren't many: towel, soap, white blouse, nightgown, hair pins of which she was very proud because they cost two-thirds of her salary and she never wore them. *Maybe I should have taken the raspberry-colored dress? But I didn't, so. . . .* She shifted her position to free her left shoulder which had gone to sleep from leaning against the wall. Some sort of light rushed by outside the window. *Mrs. Kubik said she was afraid her time might come at night. Is Kubik working the night shift today? Krystyna is on duty in the laboratory. The directress is an old louse, but no one will mumble a word to her face*, the outlines of thoughts rose within her chaotically and then ebbed, separated by long pauses filled with the clatter of wheels, monotonous and attention-demanding. *Lutek liked to recite this poem: "And in every city there are at least two hundred of you, my sisters, streets. . . ." And anyway, the point is not that there's only one street. It's only that interests vary and there should be strength for their support; where is it? as if through mist, she felt something akin to triumph. I must remember that sentence, after all, I'll be telling Lutek about it.*

The compartments resounded with mountainous snores, soiled dawn sketched wrinkles on the face of the sleeping blonde. *It's not far now*. Veronica sat on her haunches and opening her valise she noticed the black smudge on her calf. She rubbed it hard and stubbornly until the skin reddened and the dust on the handkerchief formed a pattern of breaks. She put the pins in her hair.

II

The staircase in the house where Lutek lived was poorly lighted and sleepy. The light coming from behind the wire-covered bulbs deepened the impression that someone long ago had left and forgotten this unfinished and uncleaned interior. Veronica passed dark windows each of which displayed a fragment of its metallic construction like a decoration, highlighted from behind by the constantly receding street; finally, she stopped and with a jerk of the head tossed back the strands of hair falling across her face, and she knocked on the door. It was evening already, she had spent all day looking for the address.

"Maybe you're Veronica," said a red-haired girl, without letting go the knob on the half-opened door, as if the arrival could still turn back; her delicate, childish face flickered uncertainly between ridicule and amazed sympathy; Veronica put down her valise next to a coat-filled rack and started taking off her coat. A hubbub of voices came from the interior of the apartment, the redhead moved suddenly, high heels banging against the floor, like small agile hoofs, she called out: "Veronica!"

Lutek stood with bottle in hand, bent forward, and all the others also remained immobile in their places, but she passed the redhead and walked across the room without any embarrassment, with only a slight blush on her cheeks. And then she greeted them in turn, smiling in turn—a good and gracious hostess—Stefan, Olek, Marzena, Kosooki, Gerard and Basia standing in the door. It lasted some time, so Lutek could have time to think of something, anything.

"In the first place," he said, "Veronica must catch up on the drinks."

"Pour a whole glass, if she's going to catch up with us," pointed out Marzena.

"Don't be a fool," Gerard got up from his chair. "I would like to propose a toast in your honor, madame, who have honored. . . . And for the success of this meeting. . . . In the name of the unfortunate, but happy witnesses. Because it's not every day that. . . . Hey, Lutek, I have no more vodka!"

"Let's drink, let's drink to the success of love. . . ."

"Ah! How tactless you are. . . . I look around my room in the evening and listen for your steps—maybe it's you, if I'm out the keys are downstairs. . . ."

Basia burst out laughing and ran out of the room, mouth covered with hands.

"Olek, go and calm that idiot," said Stefan sharply. "But where did you come from?"

"I. . . ."

Lutek cruised around the room pouring vodka, *a big boy dressed like a grown man*, thought Veronica. Marzena arched her eyebrows and with comical seriousness whispered something into his ear, he blushed and looked around the room helplessly.

"You want to watch TV?" but they shouted him down and when he stood there, uncertain, his hand on the knob, half turned, Veronica felt she would burst into tears at any moment and quickly took out her handkerchief. It was dirty and, naturally, everyone had to notice it, because their eyes traveled from her to Lutek and back again. Thinking about it later, she could not find a cause to account for the tears, except for the fact that she had a dirty handkerchief. And anyway, the whole evening was turning out very strangely. Lutek sat next to her and said many nice and pleasant words, following his gaze, she saw her legs, swollen after the past night and day when she had sat down only once in a milk bar, overflowing the rims of her black, patent leather, high-heeled shoes, the look was not kind, but she thought only: *Why did I put on those pins? and They're very beautiful, these girls, Marzena, Basia, I like them.* Lutek, however, appeared oblivious of the rest of the company, which whispered and giggled in the corners, until Gerard, offended, knelt in front of the couch: "We want to drink the lady's health and you won't give us any vodka."

But Veronica's glass was always full and she looked at Lutek, because everything further away was changing more and more into an unclear, jerky photograph. Lutek would lift the glass to her lips and she felt as if she had been here all the time, without any inbetween, in the only

proper place for her, surrendering to the soft wave of inertia. Lying in Lutek's lap she still heard one of the men say:

"Well, Lutek, when are you going to collect your winnings?"

And Marzena, with incomprehensible, but easily detected spitefulness: "I don't know whether it counts."

"Quit it, she's not so bad looking, the poor thing."

"So, when?"

"Things aren't yet so bad that I have to depend on your vodka. And you know what you can do with your opinions."

"Stefan, look at that expression on the pining lover's face."

"It's all conceit."

"But I still think he deserves that vodka."

"Always. . . ."

The object of argument, some kind of bet made previously, did not interest Veronica. *They're talking quietly not to wake me*, she thought, *I must tell them they don't have to, I'm not asleep*, but at that moment sleep claimed her completely.

She was wakened by a cloudy feeling of something lacking, her outstretched hand touched a pillow. She lifted her head hesitantly: Lutek was asleep on a cot on the other side of the sunny smudge which, after having squeezed in between the window shade slats, divided the room into two halves.

"Come here," said Veronica, holding back laughter, "for three years I never once woke up with such a feeling, and now . . . come, Lutek."

But she still slept, so she ran across the sunny wall and bent over him; she kept bending lower and lower with that kind of joyous trepidation which—more than anything else—hallows love and, before she touched him, his eyes opened.

Veronica lay on the cot, hands under her head, free and easy, gazing at the crumbs of light swirling in the air, returning from the bathroom Lutek walked into them and stopped, the sun highlighted the shadow of his summer tan. He said:

"What stupid friends I have. You are beautiful. You look now like a sculpture, really, Werka, your looks improved during all this time. How long is it since we saw each other? Three years! You've become more feminine. It's a shame they can't see you now. You should always be naked, my Venus Awakened From Sleep—I don't know how that would be in Greek—every dress distorts you."

Veronica felt compelled to explain her appearance of the evening before, propping herself up with an elbow, she said, "I'll tell you, I simply don't have any nice dresses, that is, I have one, raspberry-colored, but I didn't bring it with me. I . . . Where I live people have different tastes than here, in Warsaw and I . . . after all, I come from there now."

"Oh," laughed Lutek and his laughter was as before, disarming and contagious, it suited him very well, "from there! We'll change that in a matter of fifteen minutes."

"What do you mean?"

"We'll simply go shopping. 'Fashionable Wife,' IWUPE. . . * You came at the right time: I happen to have some money. I made a pile on that song I wrote for you. You should get a percentage, no? You brought me luck." He sat down on the cot and repeated almost inaudibly, "You brought me such luck. . . ."

But these were cares, rather than happiness, or—for fear of excluding anything—a somewhat careworn happiness, a happiness unexpected, despite everything, it seemed to Veronica; she figured that way whenever the confusion of Lutek's life removed her to the sidelines, by-passing her, as it were, governed by indistinct, precise regulations which she did not know and which did not take into account the reinstatement of her existence. But automatically, effortlessly, she outdistanced these—she thought—misunderstandings, sitting alone in a room on the fourth floor of the new still-unplastered apartment house, she turned on the radio, the melody: "I look at my room in the evening," resounded frequently and convincingly, Veronica suddenly realized she was searching in her mind to confirm the logic of events, irritated, she turned the dial. "And so, my dears, ink and fruit stains," said Mrs. Koc on another wavelength and Veronica would go to the bathroom to clean the stains on Lutek's suit.

That same day, that is, the day after her arrival in Warsaw, they went on a long shopping tour; taxed by the cold eyes of the salesgirls, Veronica lowered hers and mangled a handkerchief in the pocket of her cheap light-blue coat.

"Don't you like it?" asked Lutek, surprised.

"No, no . . . it's too expensive," she whispered into his ear.

"But you like it? After all, Werka, I can't decide, you're a woman. . . ."

But all she wanted was to return as quickly as possible to the turbulence of the street, one of the many, unnoticed, and if the purchased finery were to make her resemble Marzena or Basia, he had to be the one to decide. He chose badly, or maybe making her resemble them was simply impossible? They bought a gray blouse made out of something resembling soft suede, a narrow-pleated, pink skirt and seamless stockings; at the Hotel Bristol Veronica heard Lutek's friends say to one another:

"Not bad looking, but. . . ."

"I never would have believed it, but she looks like a teacher from a positive movie."

To them I'm a teacher from a positive movie, she thought, *what does it really mean?* and the effort to comprehend why they wanted her to be like the others paralyzed her account of the falsified analyses, the only thing she knew, could talk about and to which they even listened with interest, interrupting at times with effective-sounding commentary:

"Shitty country!"

They didn't even notice when she stopped in mid-sentence, being so far removed from the events told them, so much in a hurry to return to the confusion of their sul-

len complaints about the world, to that rebellion which persisted within them ready to emerge under any pretext whatever. She understood this about them, she realized it quickly, forsaken amidst exclamation points, she sat in her nice dress which proved inappropriate, and only Gerard looked into her amazement-hardened eyes—but she did not notice. At night she said to Lucjan:

"You know, where I was there is only one, solitary street. Not symbolically, but really. And facing each man who does not want to run there is only one possibility, one duty, one force. After a while it seems that there is nothing else. Nowhere in the world. But I fought back, I didn't believe it for a moment. And, of course, I heard that song. . . ."

"Poor little thing . . . But tell me, didn't I surprise you just a little bit?"

"No. Only now, maybe the provinces dulled me, but you know, Lutek, I can't find that moment, the point where they cross. . . ."

"What?"

"You know, over there, that street and all of you . . . you and your friends, your conversation, what you do. Because if they don't cross, Lutek, then it has no value for me! It's just as if it didn't exist!"

"But you can see that they do cross. Your being here is best proof of it," the momentarily brighter glow of his cigarette pinpointed Lucjan's thin, dark lips which smiled suddenly at some unspoken footnote. "Veronica, why do you want to waste time, come closer."

The new apartment had in it the old table, "Veronica's table," with its black scar, burned in by an iron they had forgotten about while kissing, it was covered by a tablecloth, but Veronica felt with her fingers the small, bullet-like indentation.

"It really is disgusting," Lutek said.

Little, white crosses shimmered on the tablecloth, she did not raise her eyes to see his smile wisely confirming nothing, after a while he got up and she heard him pace the room and the creak of floorboards blending with the sounds of a childish scuffle next door.

"Damned brats. And you, too, what is it to you whether they falsify or not. . . ."

But I come from there, Veronica wanted to say, but she didn't, stopped by fear and the sudden realization that neither he nor she knew what to do to connect these two worlds, connect them with something more than rails and if he didn't know then it was probably impossible, *impossible? rather, undesired.*

"If you want," said Lutek, "I can get Gerard, he's a good journalist, he used to be interested in this type of thing a while back. Try it, talk to him . . . He's sweet on you. . . . He was the only one of my friends who defended you. You didn't make much of a hit, I can tell you that."

"You see," said Veronica, "the measurement results are lowered to norm level, there is a norm and if it's exceeded. . . . Because those gases are very injurious to health."

"If it's exceeded then work should be stopped."

"I don't know."

"They will dismiss you sooner, or later, ma'am. People

(Continued inside back cover)

* Warsaw stores. Ed.

Current Developments

INTERNATIONAL:

Soviet bloc press and radio attack Eisenhower and the United States in the days before the summit conference, charging that the U-2 incident was an attempt by US reactionary circles to wreck the conference (p. 26).

May Day celebrations in Soviet bloc stress "peace and friendship" rather than military strength (p. 27).

POLITICAL:

Polish workers riot in Nowa Huta over the question of a church (p. 30).

Czechoslovak regime publishes a draft of its new constitution (p. 32).

Czechoslovak Communists celebrate 15th anniversary of the country's liberation by Soviet troops, announce amnesty for political prisoners (p. 33).

ECONOMIC:

Bulgarian Communists hold conference on difficulties in agriculture (p. 36).

Czechoslovak government announces price reductions for consumers (p. 33).

AREAWIDE

Before the Summit

The Soviet Premier's disclosure, May 5, that the USSR had shot down an American reconnaissance aircraft and that this invasion of Soviet territory constituted "aggressive provocation aimed at wrecking the summit conference," due to convene in Paris, May 16, was reflected by the Soviet bloc press and radio. Yet, except for Czechoslovakia, the comments were surprisingly restrained, with the East European press generally reprinting what had already appeared in the Soviet newspapers—all of which clouded previous optimism for the success of the summit meeting. An effort was also made at first to dissociate American President Eisenhower from the responsibility for reconnaissance flights over the USSR.

The Prague Party organ *Rude Pravo*, May 12, on the other hand, called Eisenhower cynical and hypocritical when he stated at his press conference, May 11, that the US was apprehensive over a "new Pearl Harbor." "It is sheer hypocrisy," *Rude Pravo* said, "when the President, using worn-out lies, tries to claim that America is threatened by aggression from the Soviet Union." The Prague journal *Zemedske Noviny*, May 12, viewed the flight of the American reconnaissance plane as exposing "the true face of

some American circles who do not desire peace and understanding."

Most Soviet bloc commentators echoed this latter view, Radio Sofia, May 10, terming the flight "another attempt to create an atmosphere of distrust and doubt in respect to the importance of the summit conference." The official Polish Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), May 10, called Soviet Premier Khrushchev's handling of the incident "a heavy blow . . . against cold war propagandists which will help the majority of Western diplomats to see more clearly the [necessity] for international relaxation of tension."

Lenin's Birthday

Paeans of praise to the memory of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin echoed throughout the Communist bloc on the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of his birth, April 19.

The prize for the best Leninist appears to have been given to Polish Party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka. His tribute to the architect of the Soviet Revolution was printed in Moscow's *Pravda* (April 19) before other articles of a similar nature by non-Soviet chieftains. In it, Gomulka stressed the principle of "equality" in relations between nations and Parties, while thanking Soviet Premier Khrushchev for "beautifully and correctly characterizing the essence of these relations" in the speech he made in Warsaw in July 1959. He also indirectly criticized Stalinism by in-

sisting that "all deviations from Leninism resulted in defeat and failure."

Also of interest was the speech of Czechoslovak Politburo member Jiri Hendrych in Prague, April 22, who declared that "the victory of Socialism is a fact in Czechoslovakia" and that the new Constitution would confirm this. Nevertheless, it would be still some time before Czechoslovakia could "proceed to the building of Communism." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 22.) The Albanians used Leninism as an excuse to attack "Yugoslav revisionism" by name, terming it "the main danger to the international Communist movement." (*Pravda* [Moscow], April 27.)

May Day Feted

From Moscow to Sofia, peace and friendship was the theme of the May Day speeches; military strength was hardly in evidence during the lengthy parades. In Warsaw, Party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka repeated the avowed Soviet foreign policy program: "complete and universal disarmament . . . immediate ban on tests with atomic and nuclear weapons . . . discontinuation of the remilitarization of West Germany . . . conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and solution to the problem of West Berlin." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 2.) Czechoslovak President Antonin Novotny, on the other hand, stressed the rise in the Czechoslovak standard of living under the Communist regime, mentioning the recent reduction in retail prices for certain foodstuffs and manufactured goods and reiterating his promise "to increase personal consumption by one-third and real wages by one-fifth by the end of 1960." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], May 2.) The only other

speech of interest was a characteristic Albanian potshot against "Greek chauvinists and Yugoslav revisionists," delivered by Politburo member Gogo Nushi. (Radio Tirana, May 1.)

Yugoslav Congress Ends

Commenting on the poor coverage accorded by the Soviet bloc press to the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Socialist Alliance (a front organization of the League of Yugoslav Communists which met in Belgrade, April 18-22), Marshal Tito said: "Nobody can isolate us from other countries. . . . [The Soviet bloc] cannot isolate us, especially from the African and Asian nations. . . . Yet it is sad that while our congress was being attended by more than 40 delegations . . . there was talk in some [East European] countries that we are trying to disrupt international order. . . . The present-day world is so closely knit that nobody can long be successful with distortions about another country. True, such acts directed against us are creating certain difficulties, but the real truth about us cannot be concealed." (Radio Belgrade, April 30.) (See also *East Europe*, May, p. 38.)


Albanian Fusillade

The Polish Communist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka claimed in Wroclaw, May 7, (see below), that "thirteen Socialist countries exist today," recognizing Yugoslavia as being one of them.* The Albanians and the Chinese Commu-

* In November 1957 Tito refused to sign the so-called Moscow Declaration—later called the "Declaration of the Twelve Ruling Parties."

Celebrating the 15th anniversary of the "liberation" of Hungary by Soviet troops: a gathering of Communist dignitaries in the Budapest Opera House on April 4.

MAGYAR HIREK (Budapest), April 15, 1960





South Korea's President Syngman Rhee, standing at the egg-bespattered door of the United States legation: "I have decided to resign."

STURSHEL (Sofia), April 29, 1960

nists, however, have continued their fierce attacks on Yugoslav "revisionism" and "the lackeys of imperialism." On May 8, Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party, speaking at Shkoder, accused the "Yugoslav revisionists" of playing "a dirty role in the attempt at increasing tension in the international arena and at weakening and splitting the Socialist camp," according to Radio Tirana of the same day. The most far-reaching speech directed at the Belgrade Communists came from Ramiz Alia, alternate member of the Albanian Politburo, on April 22, in Tirana:

"The modern revisionists, seeing that the idea of peaceful coexistence is becoming popular with the working masses all over the world, wish to extend the principle of peaceful coexistence to ideology. . . . Ideological coexistence . . . is surrendering to the enemy and a betrayal of the cause of Socialism and Communism."

Even Yugoslav support of Soviet foreign policy (particularly in evidence during the Socialist Alliance Congress) was viewed by Alia as a mere tactic. He said that the "Yugoslav revisionists" are "considering the question of peaceful coexistence from opportunist positions. . . . In order to paralyze the revolutionary movement of the working class, . . . the Yugoslav revisionists are asking the working class of the capitalist countries not to put obstacles in the way

BEATNIKS IN PRAGUE

From *Obrana Lidu*, the daily newspaper published by Czechoslovakia's Ministry of National Defense, April 17, 1960:

When he was 19 he grew a beard. It did not make him look good; he resembled an undernourished Neanderthal man. The beard did not even seem hygienic to him. Moreover, it was hot in summer, and in winter miniature but unaesthetic icicles formed on it. He made this sacrifice only because Pietro, Jerry, Dan and Charlie had beards.

He adored Françoise Sagan. He spoke enthusiastically of her over the beer at the Kravin Inn, the Turkish coffee at the Film Club, and also during his walks with Irene on the banks of the Vltava. He talked enthusiastically about her although he had read only ten pages of her. But he talked that way because Pietro, Jerry, Dan and Charlie also talked that way. . . .

He had a "serf's haircut" which gave his face an expression of imbecility. He noticed this several times when he looked at himself in the mirror. Irene noticed it even more often. All the people around him noticed it. However, he kept that "serf's haircut" because Pietro, Jerry, Dan and Charlie had it. . . .

Then he was called up for military service. He wrote a letter to his girl from there. "It's not bad, the food is good, everything else would be all right, but I feel that my individuality is being suppressed. I make a terrible impression on myself, as if I were just a copy of everybody else. All are alike, in green cloth with the same type of shoes and the same neckties. I even had to get rid of my beard, and thus I became a complete square."

of the rulers of their countries while in a period of international détente. . . . [According to the Yugoslavs] the working class is supposed to beg for peace instead of, as taught by Lenin, winning it with a firm and revolutionary struggle." (Radio Tirana, April 23.)

Yugoslav economic achievements were assailed by the Tirana Party organ *Zeri i Popullit* which claimed that "agricultural successes in 1959 were exclusively due to the favorable weather conditions and as such were temporary and occasional successes, because the level of agricultural production in Yugoslavia is [below the prewar] level." Furthermore, even this higher production is used to aid "kulaks and rich villagers . . . at the expense of the working class and the poor peasantry." (Radio Tirana, April 19.)

Moscow itself joined the anti-Yugoslav chorus after Tito refused to pin the blame for the summit conference failure wholly on the U.S.

Communist Chinese Attacks

The Chinese Communists took time out at the Peiping celebration of the 15th anniversary of the "liberation" of Czechoslovakia, May 8, to hurl insults against "Yugoslav revisionism" (Radio Peiping, May 8). In addition, on the

fifth anniversary of the Bandung Conference (of African and Asian nations), the Chinese attacked the Yugoslavs for "aiding imperialism and its onslaught on the nations of Asia and Africa," as reported in the Skopje daily, *Nova Makedonija*, April 21.

Yugoslavia Strikes Back

The Skopje journal not only quoted the Chinese allegations, but also criticized the Chinese Communists for stifling the "spirit of Bandung":

"And now, while the Chinese papers pay lip service to the Bandung anniversary, the Bandung spirit is being stifled in practice and solemn pledges are being broken—for today Chinese troops are on Indian territory, where they made their entry with bayonets leveled at their traditional Indian friends, for today Peiping brutally seeks to interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs and to snuff out Tibet's national individuality."

Albania was also blamed for charging the "Belgrade revisionists" with trying to "isolate China" and prevent her from gaining successes among the Asian peoples. To this theory, *Nova Makedonija* acidly replied: "Here, at last, the culprit has been found! Tibet rose and Chinese soldiers marched into India egged on by the 'Yugoslav revisionists.' What a Marxist analysis! What extreme political acumen and intelligence! But, what else can you expect from them?"

Commenting on the above-mentioned anti-Yugoslav tirade by the Albanian Communist Ramiz Alia, the Yugoslav Party organ, *Borba* (Belgrade), April 27, said plaintively:

"It is not strange that such provocations against peace and cooperation come from Albania, but it is very strange that representatives of the Socialist Camp have not dissociated themselves from such monstrous phenomena and inimical attitudes against the policy of coexistence as practiced by the Albanian leaders."

Relations With Other Communist Nations

With the rest of the Soviet bloc countries, Belgrade continued to maintain good relations. Yugoslavia and Romania agreed to collaborate on the construction of two hydroelectric power stations at the "Iron Gates" section of the Danube River (Radio Bucharest, April 21). A Yugoslav trade union delegation went to Warsaw, April 24, for conferences with Polish counterparts (Radio Belgrade, April 25); and the president of the Belgrade People's Committee was in Budapest, April 10-16, at the invitation of the Budapest City Council. (Tanjug, April 16.) Two agreements were signed between Belgrade and Sofia—for cooperation in the field of radio and television broadcasting, April 8 (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], April 9), and for scientific-technical collaboration, April 27 (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 28).

Still, the Yugoslavs were quick to answer any insult, no matter how slight. The Ljubljana daily, *Delo*, May 11, protested against the Bulgarian news agency for claiming that in 1944 Bulgarian troops "liberated" many parts of Yugoslavia. In the same issue, *Delo* declared that Hun-

garian Deputy Premier Antal Apro in a lecture to the Party Institute in Budapest had accused the "Yugoslav revisionists" of rejecting the statement that Comecon (Soviet bloc economic group) "is an institution based on the principles of sovereign equality for all member-States."

POLAND

New Propaganda Chief

Leon Stasiak has been appointed head of the Party Central Committee Propaganda Department, replacing Andrzej Werblan, who has been transferred to the post of director of the Central Committee Education and Science Department. The latter department had been without a chief since the dismissal of Jerzy Morawski from the politburo and Party Secretariat last November.

A secretary of the Poznan Party Committee during the June 1956 riots, Stasiak was called to Warsaw some months later and named deputy propaganda chief in the Central Committee. (*Trybuna Ludu*, [Warsaw], April 25.)


Prominent Communists Dismissed

Deputy Minister of National Defense General Janusz Zarzycki, a leader of Communist underground units during World War II, was removed from his post and named chairman of the Warsaw National Council. (Radio Warsaw, March 5.) In addition, Western sources reported that Jerzy Albrecht, a Secretary of the Party Central Commit-

A May Day crowd in Prague.

SVET V OBRAZECH (Prague), May 7, 1960





Design for the new church that was to have been built in Nowa Huta. This won first prize in a competition for architects.

ARCHITEKTURA (Warsaw), No. 3, 1958

A Church for Nowa Huta?

POLAND'S NEW "Socialist city" of Nowa Huta broke into world headlines late in April as the scene of a religious demonstration that ended in a riot. The trouble started when workmen began to remove a cross from a site that had been designated for the construction of a church. A group of women appeared, singing hymns; when the crowd grew to an estimated 2,000, police used clubs and tear gas to drive the demonstrators away. In the fighting that resulted, 15 policemen and several score civilians were reported to have been injured. About 50 persons were arrested, according to *The New York Times*, April 28.

The Polish authorities immediately lowered a curtain of censorship over the embarrassing incident. A correspondent for the Paris *Le Monde*, May 2, reported that all foreign journalists in Cracow had been placed under close surveillance. The Cracow newspaper *Dziennik Polski*,

tee, had resigned. Both of these men were considered in 1956 supporters of Wladyslaw Gomulka. In Zarzycki's case, he had been in charge of the political education office of the Polish armed forces and had apparently sponsored the recent publication of General Ignacy Blum's book, "History of the Political Apparatus in the Polish Army." This work suggested that soldiers should be trained in the "Polish" or "national" spirit and was condemned in the *Military History Review*, the official organ of the Central Office of Military Political Education.

Youth Group Convenes

The Second Congress of the "Socialist" Youth Union (ZMS) met in Warsaw, April 25-29, and was attended by over 1,200 delegates. Formed three years ago as a Party-controlled organization of Polish youth after the virtual disintegration of the old Union of Polish Youth, membership has grown to 475,000. In the main address, Party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka warned his audience against the dangers of "reaction" and "imperialism" and urged youth to "be educated in a spirit of patriotism but free of poisonous nationalism." He dwelt at some length on "propaganda hostile to Socialism," explaining that "a leap from one social system to another . . . does not automatically bring with it a leap in human ideas, ideas shaped by the former ruling classes and by centuries-old traditions. The new penetrates the old, but the old lives on for a long time in the new."

Marian Renke was re-elected ZMS First Secretary, and the Congress ratified a new statute lowering the minimal age limit for members to 15 years. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], April 26, 28.)

Japanese Diplomat Expelled

Hisahi Doshio, First Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Warsaw, was declared *persona non grata* by the Polish government and ordered to leave the country as soon as possible. He was accused of "buying State secrets" and was allegedly apprehended while collecting such information. (Radio Warsaw, April 26.)

Bishop Searched

Relations between Church and State were further exacerbated by the treatment accorded Polish Bishop Kowalski on his return from Rome to Poland. The Bishop was apparently detained, searched and had religious material obtained in Rome confiscated at the Polish border, according to the Milan daily, *Corriere della Sera*, May 8. Regime authorities also seized a papal letter to Cardinal Wyszynski.

Film Provokes Critical Dispute

After the recent premiere of the Polish film "The Town," the official Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), April 21, and *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw) of the same date sharply clashed in their critical estimates. In *Trybuna Ludu's* view, the film-makers "depicted a contemporary Polish small town as a community of nothing but ugliness, poverty, narrow horizons. . . . Nothing in it has changed for the last 50 years, not to mention the last 15, and nothing can be changed." The reviewer charged that the film was filled "with half-truths which are worse than no truth at all."

April 30, printed a short official communique stating that the disturbances had been provoked by "fanatical and excitable women" and exploited by "irresponsible individuals." It blamed the local authorities for not having kept the population "fully informed" of the decisions taken by the government.

A "Socialist City"

Nowa Huta is an iron and steel town, erected in the last ten years as a symbol of the new Communist Poland. It quickly became a huge industrial slum, and was celebrated in Adam Wazyk's famous "Poem for Adults," published in 1955, as a symbol of misery. When Gomulka returned to power in October 1956, efforts were made to improve life in Nowa Huta. The town of 100,000 was given its first movie house and its first theater; a House of Culture was erected and plans were made for the building of a church. In 1958 a site was selected and marked with a huge wooden cross. Since then the construction of the church had been several times postponed, although church authorities collected over 8 million *zloty* for the project. Finally, the cross was ordered removed in order to make way for the construction of a school.

The Nowa Huta rioting may have shaken the rickety entente which Church and State authorities have purportedly been building in recent months. According to some Western sources, the Church had agreed to support the Gomulka regime in its struggle against economic corruption and poor work discipline, in return for Gomulka's agreement not to curtail religious instruction in the public schools. (See *East Europe*, May, p. 39.)

In Olsztyn, Too

The town of Olsztyn in the former German territory of East Prussia was the scene of another religious protest late in April. Local police, apparently acting on their own initiative, tried to pull down Polish flags which were being hung to honor the holy picture of the "Black Madonna" on display in the city. According to a Reuters dispatch of April 30, many of the demonstrators were injured and over 50 arrested.

(For a Communist camera-eye view of the sprawling town of Nowa Huta as it looked a year ago, see the bottom of the page.)

The main objection was that there were "no signs of the new order of life, nothing, nothing but despair and stagnation." Even the "happy ending" was criticized as jarring with the rest of the movie, thus appearing as "the worst type of slogan."

The other journal, also edited by Party Central Committee members, praised the film: "Anybody who hasn't been in Widlakow [the name of the film's town] does not know the whole truth about his country. . . . It is a concrete personification of life in small towns." Here, too, the ending was criticized, but the daily also informed its readers that the original ending showed the heroes running away from the town in an old automobile, only to return at dawn in the same car, drawn by a half-starved horse—"a return

as sad as the funeral of hope." While not defending the original ending, *Zycie Warszawy* considered the change, demanded by the censors, as even worse, describing it as "flagrantly in contrast to the rest of the picture, as if borrowed from a decade ago, when film-makers limited their activities to the showing of slides."

Western Territories Week

Poland celebrated Western Territories Week, May 7-15. A large delegation of government and Party officials arrived in Wroclaw (formerly the German city of Breslau) on the opening day of the celebration, headed by Party boss Wladyslaw Gomulka and Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz. In

Workers' flats in Nowa Huta.

SWIAT (Warsaw), May 3, 1959



a lengthy address, Gomulka praised the development of industry in the Western Territories, but criticized agricultural progress, stating that the prewar level in this area had still not been achieved. He lauded the Soviet Union for its role in the "liberation" of Poland and spoke kindly of French President de Gaulle for his support of the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent boundary between Poland and Germany. (Radio Warsaw, May 7.) The following day Cyrankiewicz bitterly attacked West Germany and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as a man "seeking to revive German militarism and allowing Nazis to occupy high government posts." (Radio Warsaw, May 8.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

New Constitution Published

A draft of the new Czechoslovak Constitution appeared in the Prague and Bratislava Party organs, April 19. The most significant portion of the new text is the proclamation that Czechoslovakia is completing its task of "building Socialism" and will soon embark on the second phase of its

development—"the transition to Communism." Party chief Antonin Novotny explained the development in a speech before the Party Central Committee, April 7:

"We have solved the basic tasks of the transition from capitalism to Socialism: by now the new Socialist production relations have prevailed and become consolidated in all branches of our national economy, including agriculture. This has brought about a change in the class structure of our society in which the exploiters as a class have been eliminated. . . . The leading position [of the workers' class] in society has been consolidated and its decisive influence on all activities in our country has increased." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 17.)

The powers of the President of the Republic have been curtailed: in a change from the provisions of the 1948 Constitution the new President will not have the right to dissolve the National Assembly nor the right of veto. Other significant changes include the omission of any guarantee that "the conviction or world outlook" of a Czechoslovak citizen would be respected; the new document insists that "the development of education and all cultural policy . . . are carried out in the spirit of scientific . . . Marxism-Leninism." Personal ownership has been restricted to "consumer goods" and "savings acquired through work."



Young delegates to the Second Congress of the Polish Socialist Youth Union held in Warsaw in April.

SWIAT (Warsaw), May 8, 1960



Dana Smutna, star of the Czechoslovak film "Romeo, Juliet and Darkness," set in the time of the Nazi occupation.

SVET V OBRAZECH (Prague), April 16, 1960

SWASTIKAS IN HUNGARY

"The two young workers of the Hungarian State Railway repair shop in Miskolc who drew swastikas near the plant, wanted to disgrace the fight for peace . . . to demonstrate their loyalty to those assassinating the workers of imperialist countries who stand up for peace. Do these two young men know what the swastika symbolizes? I don't think they do. But this does not mean that the Communists and honest workers of the repair shop should not feel responsible for the crime. We workers are responsible for the attitude of our fellow workers toward our wonderful program, the building of Socialist Hungary. We are also responsible for the elderly worker who said: 'You just wait until Hitler comes, and he'll make leather bookends out of your skin.' I don't think a single worker took this as a joke. We are by no means unhappy, we like good jokes, but we cannot put up with the irresponsible remarks made by some men among us. Let us confess that we often overlook similar 'jokes,' although we would do well to ponder over them and put an end to them."

From *Eszakmagyarország*, the daily paper of Abauj-Zemplen County, April 17, 1960

NO PROLETARIANS IN HUNGARY

"There are no proletarians anymore in Hungary. . . . According to Marxist doctrine, the proletariat is a 'historical category' — i.e., it is not eternal, has not always existed, and will not always exist in the future. There is only a proletariat in places where there is a bourgeoisie."

"Has this change occurred because of the rise in living standards? . . . The rise in living standards is not the only reason for the disappearance of the proletariat. One cannot say, for example, that in West Germany, Britain or the United States the workers have a lower standard of living than in Hungary. . . . However, the workers of those three countries are proletarians, while under the conditions of the Hungarian People's Republic and despite a lower standard of living, the Hungarian worker cannot be regarded as a proletarian. . . ."

"Proletarians fight for the elimination of capitalist exploitation, and workers who have liberated themselves [as in Hungary — Ed.] stand prepared to fight against every attempt at the restoration of capitalist oppression and for the defense of their liberty. . . ."

Nepszava (Budapest), April 1, 1960

Centralism Stressed

The considerable degree of autonomy accorded Slovakia in the 1948 Constitution has been restricted. The Slovak Board of Commissioners, the organ of executive power, has been abolished. The legislative body, the Slovak National Council, will be vested with some executive authority; in practice, however, the Prague government will be in firm control. Novotny in the same speech quoted above gave the following reasons for Slovakia's new status:

"The age-old backwardness of Slovakia has been abolished and Slovakia today is an economically, politically and culturally mature part of the republic. . . . Through all this the substantial differences formerly existing between the Czech and Slovak regions have been markedly reduced. . . . The adjustments to be made in the Slovak national organs result from the fact that the central direction of the entire life of our society under a unified State plan continues to expand."

Czechoslovak "Liberation" Commemorated

The fifteenth anniversary celebrations of the Czechoslovak "liberation" by the Red Army, and of the Prague Uprising, began May 4 with a "festive evening" in Prague's Lucerna Hall. The major address was given by First Deputy Premier Jaromir Dolansky, who hailed the Uprising as exclusively Communist-inspired and accused "bourgeois elements" of having tried to seek an accommodation with the Nazis in order to prevent the "Socialist revolution." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], May 5.) On May 9, after a

military parade, President Antonin Novotny assured a large crowd that Communism would be victorious, praised "the indestructible union of the Czechs and Slovaks," and insisted that no one could upset "the alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union which provides security for our Socialist homeland." (*Rude Pravo*, May 10.)

Amnesty Decreed

In honor of the occasion, the government proclaimed an amnesty for persons "who have committed criminal offenses against the republic." This amnesty does not apply "to direct agents of imperialist intelligence services, terrorists, saboteurs . . . persons sentenced for military treason or other anti-State acts, etc." Another main provision of the decree was to excuse prison sentences for those who "have illegally left the Republic"; persons who left "under the influence of hostile propaganda" will be able to return without danger of punishment. (*Rude Pravo*, May 9.)

Retail Price Cuts, Other Concessions

The Party Central Committee on April 22 announced several measures aimed at raising the standard of living of the population. Most important was a decree reducing the prices of some foodstuffs and industrial goods, effective April 24—the eighth reduction since 1953. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 23.) Lower food prices apply to various kinds and qualities of sugar (granulated, 4.6 percent); rice (choice, 20 percent); coffee (cheapest, 6.7 percent); tea (Ceylon, 4.6 percent); candy; and a few canned goods.

Price cuts on industrial consumer goods include an array of clothing, piece goods, textile materials, household appliances and other consumer durables. (Percentage drops in a few of these items are as follows: men's wool mixture suits, 14; women's wool mixture coats, 22.2; wool suiting material, 16.5; women's dress material, 20; flannel blankets, 28.6; electric sewing machines, 26.4; electric floor polishers, 15; television sets, 35 cm. screen, 16.2; table model radios, 22; phonographs, 16.7; tape recorders, 13.2; portable typewriters, 25.) The price cuts are greatest among the lower quality products.

The foodstuffs affected by this decree comprise a relatively small range of non-staple commodities. More than two-thirds of the 2.36 billion *koruny* which the population is to save annually will come from price reductions on industrial goods. Czechoslovakia's stagnant agriculture was blamed for the small concessions made on foodstuffs. According to Politburo member Otakar Simunek, further price reductions in such staple foods as meats, fats and flour "depend on a radical change in agricultural production."

A unique feature of this decree is a provision "that steps will be taken to insure that commodities . . . affected by the price reduction remain on the market in the same quality and at the same price, or, as the case may be, unchanged in style, for at least two years." This promise was evidently prompted by public criticism after price reductions in earlier years. A specific product would often disappear from the market shortly after a price cut took effect.

Other Measures

In addition to the price concessions on consumer goods, the basic electricity rate for households was reduced by 12.5 percent, or from .80 to .70 *koruny* per kwh. Progressive rates which climb with increasing consumption were abolished; and the total saving, said to affect some 3 million households, was put at 300 million *koruny* annually. Another measure, touching "almost half of all families" and saving them 400 million *koruny* yearly, provides for free distribution of schoolbooks and supplies to each pupil in the general school system, including secondary, vocational and apprentice-training schools—effective September 1. Finally, 120 million *koruny* will be allocated between May 1 and the end of this year to increase the income of 230,000 pensioners. This applies to old-age and disability pensions below 600 *koruny* monthly; pensions under 800 *koruny* monthly of former miners and veterans of the "fight against fascism"; and other "social pensions" of long-time employees according to the discretion of the social security commission.

British Bonds

The Prague Government has made a formal bid to purchase the three British bond issues on which it defaulted at the end of last year—but at reduced prices, according to the London *Economist*, April 23. The offer amounted to 75 percent of the nominal value of the 1922 loans (200,000 pounds outstanding) to the Czechoslovak State and to the City of Prague and 55 percent of the nominal value of the

first mortgage debentures (600,000 pounds) of the Skoda Works—now the Lenin Machine Works. The *Economist* quoted a spokesman for the British Council of Foreign Bondholders as expressing "deep regret" that Czechoslovakia has "wantonly destroyed its credit and inflicted unjustifiable loss on its bondholders."

A three-year trade agreement has been signed between the two countries, but the quotas on the import of Czechoslovak goods have been slightly reduced.

Novotny Visits USSR

Party First Secretary and President Antonin Novotny spent two days in Moscow for the exhibition, "Czechoslovakia 1960," May 3. At the opening ceremonies of the exhibition, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev hailed the economic achievements of Czechoslovakia, but also went on to answer the "bourgeois" criticism that Czechoslovakia had been a highly industrialized country under capitalism and "no particular successes have been achieved in the economy of Socialist Czechoslovakia":

"It must be admitted that capitalism bequeathed to the people's power a fairly well-developed industry and agriculture. This means that the starting positions of the country in its advance along the road to Socialism were much more favorable than in neighboring People's Democracies. This made it possible for the Czechoslovak people to move along more rapidly toward a new life. But if one probes the question more deeply, one cannot fail to see the economic basis of the old Czechoslovakia was in no way as ideal as bourgeois propaganda tries to make it. . . . The country's industry was strictly dependent on the monopolies of France, Germany and other imperialist States. . . . The country's economy was in the grip of crisis and for many years in a state of virtual stagnation. To this one must add such inevitable plagues of capitalism as the existence of hundreds of thousands of unemployed and the absence of mass political rights." (Radio Moscow, May 3.)

Greater Authority for National Committees

District, regional and municipal National Committees (organs of local government) have received an increased measure of administrative power; however, there will apparently be no decentralization in matters of policy. This decision, taken at a meeting of the Party Central Committee, April 7-8, was explained in a report delivered by Oldrich Cernik, a secretary of the Central Committee. According to Cernik, the Committees will play a significant part "in the gradual transition to Communist self-government." Within the Committees, special commissions will be elected and will assume the executive role, particularly in administering certain branches of the economy. (Radio Prague, April 11.)

Puppet Parties Meet

Although the new Czechoslovak Constitution seems to envisage a National Front excluding non-Communist parties, the puppet parties will remain in operation at least until after the elections in June. At a national conference

of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, April 23-24, the new chairman Alois Neuman hailed the achievements of the Communist Party and urged delegates to work for the election of the National Front candidates. (*Svobodne Slovo* [Prague], April 26.) The Czechoslovak People's Party held district conferences, April 23-24, and took the occasion to hail "all measures" taken by the Czechoslovak Communists. (*Lidova Demokracie* [Prague], April 26.)

American Film Shown

For the first time in ten years, an American film, "War and Peace," was shown in Czechoslovakia. Two other films, "The Old Man and the Sea" and "Moby Dick," are also included in the exchange agreement which made these screenings possible. The reviews of "War and Peace" were mixed, but more favorable than not. (*Prace* [Prague], April 7.)

Slovak Science Academy Merges

The whittling away of Slovakia's autonomy continued with the announcement that the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in Prague and the Slovak Academy will merge. The latter institution will retain its title but will, in fact, become a branch of the central Academy in Prague. Chairman of the Slovak Academy Siracky explained that "our State science and research must be directed from one supreme institution . . . in this period of the completion of the building of Socialism and in the transition to Communism." (*Pravda* [Bratislava], April 13.)

THE CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS WRONG

"A dissatisfied guest in a tourist hotel, a passenger whose bus is late, a client poorly serviced by the water department, etc., have no legal powers against the institutions which are obliged to service their needs. The only recourse—writing complaints to the authorities—brings no result. This state of affairs is accepted as a necessary evil which will disappear in some indefinite future time. . . . We remain powerless before the ill will and discourtesy shown by various people in various State-run enterprises. . . . We still have the legal code of the capitalist system which simply did not envisage the situations which occur today. In the capitalist system incompetence was restricted by free competition. Today we are ready to accept the principle of priority for national interests and the resulting hierarchy of public needs, but this does not mean that we can tolerate the lack of legal equality in cases when we can afford certain services. . . . If, for national reasons, we cannot afford all types of public services yet, we must nevertheless be assured that in the services we do have we are equal partners and the law defends both sides."

Przegląd Kulturalny (Warsaw), March 31, 1960

HUNGARY

New Civil Code

A new civil code, effective May 1, was decreed at a cabinet meeting on April 12. The main purpose of the code is the protection of the "people's property." In Hungary, as well as in other countries of the bloc, much crime involves thievery and plundering of State-owned materials and implements. The new law will also insure greater security for personal property, according to the official Hungarian news agency, April 12.

Polytechnicism in the Universities

Having last year completed the transition to polytechnicism—academic studies combined with practical training—in secondary schools, the Hungarian regime is now prepared to apply this system at the university level. The admissions' requirements will include one year of manual labor and the recommendation of the enterprise in which the student works. University studies will be geared to allot more time for "practical experiments." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], April 12.) According to the Ministry of Education, the universities suffer from "obsolete and overcrowded curricula" and "weaknesses in ideological training." To solve the latter problem, Marxist-Leninist studies will be introduced in such subjects as religious and scientific history. (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], April 20.)

Private Plots Strengthened

A new decree, strengthening the role of collective farmers' private plots as a means of improving the situation in cattle-breeding "in justified cases," has been issued jointly by the Ministries of Agriculture and Food, according to *Zalai Hirlap*, daily organ of Zala county, April 14. The decree not only makes it compulsory for the leaders of collective farms to help increase the animal stock of the private plots by providing sufficient fodder and pasture, but it also stipulates that those collective farm members who now have no cattle on their private plots may buy breeding heifers on credit from the State. This year, 10,000 of these animals will be made available and in 1961 the number will be increased to 20,000. Regulations governing the sale of cattle from the private plots will be announced by a later Government decree, the paper said. This move goes one step beyond those recently taken in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, where the incentive of private ownership is also being used to overcome the adverse affects of collectivization on cattle-breeding—and thus on the supply of meat.

Although the regime has consistently denied the existence of a meat shortage in the country, *Nepszava* (Budapest), April 12, stated that "the demand for pork meat and meat products could not be completely met, particularly in the countryside" during 1959.



"A Problem in Four Unknowns." Drinking plus flirting plus gambling plus smoking = 2 (a failing mark in Bulgarian schools).

NARODNA MLADEJ (Sofia), April 9, 1960

BULGARIA

The Trouble with Agriculture: "Localism"

With their sights set on a 32 percent increase in agricultural output during 1960, Party leaders are showing increasing concern over the rural sector, fearing that it may repeat last year's grossly under-plan performance. The issue brought the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers together with local agricultural officials for a conference in Sofia on April 25. The problems discussed were not new: the lag in cattle-breeding, the fodder shortage, irrigation (see *East Europe*, May, pp. 46-47) and lack of coordination in the channels of supply and distribution (see *East Europe*, November, 1959, pp. 51-52). But they were pressing: the plan fulfillment report for the first quarter (January-March) of 1960 stated that the number of cattle had declined in several districts as compared with the beginning of the year, and that the slaughtering of sheep and fowl had also increased. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], April 24.) An article in *Trud* (Sofia), April 4, said that the 1959 plan to bring 6 million decars under full irrigation had been fulfilled by only 41.5 percent.

Premier Anton Yugov, in his report to the agricultural conference, placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the local officials, who, he said, "put their local interest against the national and State interest." The leaders of the communities and collective farms were accused of failing to comply with the government's directives: the slaughtering of cattle without official permit was being allowed; efforts to overcome peasant resistance to corn cultivation were not being pushed; tools and equipment for irrigation were being wasted. Moreover, Yugov said, "a considerable part of the agricultural output is diverted [into the free market—Ed.] instead of being sold to the State, and this creates difficulties in supplying the population and in insuring the necessary raw materials for industry." Party chief Todor Zhivkov closed the conference with a warning: "strict observation of State discipline" and "unconditional

THE "BROTHERS" CONTROVERSY

When the Soviet novel "The Brothers Yersov," by Vladimir Kochetov, originally appeared in 1958 it caused a good deal of a stir. Some Soviet critics hailed it as the "answer" to Vladimir Dudintsev's critical novel "Not By Bread Alone." Others were less enthusiastic. Now a debate about the book has flared up in Hungary. Ferenc Botka, in the February issue of the Budapest literary journal *Nagyvilag*, took his colleagues to task for their highly favorable reviews of the book. The background of the novel is the 1955-56 "thaw" and the sudden appearance of "strange personalities who, in order to live their own parasitic lives at the expense of the workers, let their instincts run wild" — as a Hungarian critic in *Falusi Vasarnap* (Budapest), June 7, 1959, described it. The Hungarian reviews were even more enthusiastic than the Soviet ones, and this was what Botka mainly attacked: "Hungarian criticism did not approach the heights of the comradely Soviet discussion. It was often superficial and erroneous: but mostly it only nodded in agreement. It did not debate." Botka also found distortions in the "symptoms of revisionism presented in the novel," and the fact that the "revisionists" were sketched too darkly for belief.

Comments published in the April *Nagyvilag* openly attacked Botka's standpoint from a political perspective. One contributor justified the reviewers with this argument:

"Botka passionately maintains that Hungarian criticism should state clearly that Kochetov exaggerates the danger of revisionism. . . . But even if the revisionist attack in the Soviet Union was perhaps not as dangerous as Kochetov presented it, let us not forget that in our country, it led to counterrevolution."


Another reviewer suggested that Hungarian criticism in this case proved that it was not merely "nodding in agreement" with the Soviets, but, in fact, "forming its own opinion independently."

fulfillment of obligations toward the State." (*Rabotnicesko Delo* [Sofia], April 26.)

Following the conference, the press continued to echo the leader's strictures on local officialdom. *Rabotnicesko Delo*, April 29, complained that Sofia was short of vegetables due to the failure of collective farms to fulfill their obligations. On May 5, the same newspaper noted a serious lag in spring planting, blaming local Party committees and municipal authorities.

Also in Industry

The drive for "State discipline" has been directed against "shortcomings" in industry as well. *Rabotnicesko Delo*, April 19, decried "a kind of sluggishness . . . of Socialist competition" and "unsystematic fulfillment of the economic plans, especially in building." It criticized over-stocking of metals and other raw materials and "mutual favors between individual enterprises . . . at the expense of centrally planned production." According to Radio Sofia, April 27, ten large enterprises were checked by the State Planning Commission during February and March; in each, "non-Socialist planning, poor economy in the use of raw materials, and even waste of them" was found. Managers of these enterprises were fired or severely reprimanded, the report said.



An attack on the American policy toward suspension of atomic tests. The war god Mars says: "Well, if we can't do it by light of day, we'll have to go underground."

URZICA (Bucharest), March 31, 1960

ROMANIA

Leadership Changes in Writers' Union

At a plenum of the Writers' Union in early April, the Secretariat and Bureau of the Union were reorganized along the following lines. Istvan Nagy, Aurel Baranga and Zaharia Stancu were elected secretaries; Ferenc Szemler and Mihail Gafita were dropped. There are four new members of the Bureau—Eugen Barbu, Anton Breitenhofer, Gyorgy Kovacs and Cicerone Teodorescu. The most striking aspect of the changes is the promotion of three ethnic minority leaders, Nagy and Kovacs (Hungarian) and Breitenhofer (German). This move, following the integration of minority and Romanian schools in Transylvania last year, may be an attempt to give prestige to minority leaders considered loyal to the regime. (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], April 3.)

THE U-2 INCIDENT

From an editorial in the Hungarian Communist newspaper *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), May 10, 1960:

"Although the spying failed, it is now evident that the USSR has anti-aircraft rockets against which there is no protection even at great height. Along with this lesson Americans could also learn that their belligerent politicians and generals, who start provocative actions against the USSR without, so it is said, even the knowledge of Eisenhower, are bound to lose in their criminal machinations. . . .

"Some people [in the United States] think that the chief trouble was that this grave provocation was committed just before the summit meeting. Others merely blame those concerned for having done it so clumsily. These people still do not realize, or refuse to admit, that it was not the pilot's clumsiness but the criminal spy activity itself that brought about the present situation. Some people are indignant because—for the first time in the history of the US—the fact of spying has been admitted. There was no alternative, for the proofs were irrefutable. Very few voices in US official and responsible circles reckon with the facts, with the demands of millions of people for international detente; these millions of people, having learned from this case, will draw the appropriate conclusion—i.e., that such gangsterism should be discontinued. . . .

"The USSR has put a check to this business by disclosing the facts to the world. It is to be hoped that the exposure of this dangerous provocation will serve as a good lesson to the Turkish, Pakistani, Norwegian and other NATO States, which might be plunged into grave danger by the policies of the Pentagon. . . ."

Texts and Documents

TWO VIEWS OF COEXISTENCE

The spectacular blowup that scuttled the Paris summit conference has set the world speculating as to why Premier Khrushchev took such an uncompromising stand on the U-2 incident. Among other factors, it is known that some forces in the Communist world are opposed to a reduction of East-West tensions. An outspoken example of this "hard" attitude appeared in the Communist Chinese magazine Red Flag (Peiping), No. 7, 1960, on the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, in an article entitled, "On Imperialism as the Source of War in Modern Times, and On the Way for All Peoples to Struggle for Peace." The author, Yu Chao-li, insists that war is inevitable under conditions of "capitalist imperialism," and that the Communist bloc can hope for peaceful coexistence with the West only so long as the West fears to start a war. The translation here is from the broadcast by Radio Peiping, March 30, with emphases as in the original.

Preceding the belligerent Chinese article is the following editorial from Pravda (Moscow), April 30. Although the language is similar, the Soviet viewpoint as expressed here (before the summit and the "spy plane" episode) is more positive.

A SOVIET VIEW

PEOPLE IN DIFFERENT parts of the globe call our 20th century a milestone in the triumph of Marxism-Leninism. The great revolutionary ideas which have taken hold of millions have brought about gigantic strides in the fate of mankind. The formation of the world system of Socialism, which embraces over a billion people, represents a triumph of Marxist-Leninist teaching, an irrefutable proof of the truth of the laws discovered by it regarding the development of society.

With the emergence of Socialism into the international arena there arose the question of mutual relations between the new Socialist system and the obsolete capitalist system. History knows many examples of fierce clashes between the old departing social-economic system and the new system which has come to replace it. History also knows that the dreadful scourge of mankind, war, was a feature of all social systems which preceded Socialism. But war is a manifestation which is alien to the very nature of Socialism. The great Lenin said: "The end of war, and peace between peoples, cessation of plunder and oppression, is our ideal."

Who does not know that one of the main slogans of the Great October Socialist Revolution was the slogan "peace," and that the first foreign policy legislative act of the world's first Socialist State was the Leninist decree on peace. The world bourgeoisie immediately unleashed war

on the young Soviet Republic. Despite this, Lenin, proceeding from the nature of Socialist society, and creatively developing Marxist science, in the first years of Soviet power reached the conclusion on the need for peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and Socialist States.

Imperialist propaganda often asserts that peaceful coexistence is beneficial to the Soviet Union and is therefore a tactical move of Soviet foreign policy. Imperialist propaganda is deliberately silent about the fact that the idea of peaceful coexistence was the lodestar of the foreign policy of the Soviet State in the days when our country was economically weak and stood alone. It is also the lodestar of the powerful Soviet Union and of the entire great Socialist camp at the present time. It is most characteristic that it is the USSR, which has indisputable superiority in the military sphere, which put before the world the question of universal and complete disarmament.

Greeting the May Day festival, the Soviet people over and over again express their boundless approval of the foreign policy of Party and government. Long live the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the policy of peaceful coexistence of States with differing social systems, the policy of preservation and strengthening of peace and the security of peoples, the respect for their freedom and independence, the development of economic and cultural contacts with all.

The Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence has withstood the test of time.

The consistent efforts of the Soviet Government directed at the lessening of international tension, at the peaceful solution of international questions, and the strengthening of business and cultural contacts between States regardless of social systems, have been fruitful and have received wide international recognition.

The consistent struggle of the Soviet Union for peaceful coexistence has brought about a considerable thaw in the international situation. The historic visit of Comrade Khrushchev to the United States, his visits to a number of Asian countries and to France, his meetings with heads of States and governments, and also with other statesmen and public figures and with the broad popular masses of foreign countries have in a decisive fashion promoted a lessening of international tension and made a considerable contribution to the consolidation of peace on earth.

A great victory in the policy of peaceful coexistence is the convening of the summit conference. On May 16 the leaders of four powers, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France will gather in Paris to discuss vital questions of the present international situation.

The people of the whole world, who warmly welcome this conference, hope that it will lead to the solution of many problems dividing East and West and hampering the development of normal relations between States.

The Soviet Government, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev emphasized in his speech at Baku, will spare no efforts that this conference may be successful and fruitful, so that as a result of it the peoples may be able to note with satisfaction that a new and important step for the strengthening of peace has been made. Such is the approach of the Soviet Union to the most important problems of peaceful coexistence.

Tension and the West

This is not the approach of certain influential circles in the West. Usually the ruling circles of some Western countries state that they support the idea of peaceful coexistence. But to be governed by the principles of peaceful coexistence means to strive for the removal of the causes of tension in relations between States, not only by words but by deeds. The Western powers do not show, for example, any desire to carry out the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly on universal and complete disarmament. The proposal submitted by them in the 10-nation committee leaves

the whole business of disarmament in the same fruitless position which it occupied in the gloomiest years of the cold war.

Conversation is held not about disarmament but only about control of armaments. Just as fruitless is the position of some statesmen of the Western powers on the German question. In this matter some of them are inclined to follow Adenauer in demanding a firm, and even a rigid, attitude toward the peace-loving and constructive proposals of the Soviet Union.

Evidently not all the statesmen of the West have yet a realistic conception of the possible consequence of their neglect of the principles of peaceful coexistence in solving the most important problems of modern times. Retention of arms means retention of the danger of a new war. War, with present means of waging it, would be a catastrophe for the peoples.

Equally, any attempt to preserve permanently the hotspot of tension in West Berlin and to perpetuate its occupation by the Western powers is fraught with the danger of military clashes. The position of the Western powers on the disarmament question, and in drawing a line under the results of World War II on the eve of the Paris conference, make one assume that in the Western countries the influence of the opponents of peaceful coexistence remains strong, the influence of those aggressive circles which recently attempted to conduct the notorious "from a position of strength" policy and balancing on the brink of war.

The historical peculiarities of our times are such that only two roads are open before mankind—one to peaceful coexistence between Socialist and capitalist States and the other the abyss of war. The Soviet State, the fraternal countries of the mighty Socialist camp, all progressive mankind, are conducting a consistent struggle, which does not slacken for one minute, so that the second road, fateful for the peoples, may be closed once and for all.

The forces of peace are growing and multiplying, not by the day, but by the hour. They are rising and consolidating in all continents, in all countries, in all corners of the globe.

Millions and millions of people are taking up, fervently and wholeheartedly, as a military motto, the May Day slogan of the Central Committee of our Leninist party: "Peoples of all countries, peace is life. Resolutely expose the imperialist warmongers. Struggle for peace and the security of the peoples, for the elimination of war from the life of society forever."

A CHINESE VIEW

IT IS CURRENTLY an important political task of all people in the world to carry out struggles for safeguarding and winning lasting world peace. This struggle for winning peace must, on our part, be directed pointedly against the imperialist war forces to combat aggression and the war policies of imperialism. This is very plain logic, to us.

Lenin taught us that, in the era of imperialism, the system of imperialism is the source of war. Imperialist war is the continuation of imperialism's policy of aggression and enslavement. In time of peace, the imperialists must adopt policies to continually expand the ruling power of monopoly capital. Their exploitation and oppression of the people at home, their domination and plunder in the colonies and semicolonies, and the rivalry between the groups of monopoly capital in various countries, in fact, breed new wars.

To the imperialists, peace is nothing more than an interval between wars. Taking advantage of the interval, they work energetically to expand their arms and prepare for the next war. Their wars aim at a redistribution of territory in the world among them and, under given conditions, establishing peace treaties needed by imperialism. The peace and peace treaties which meet with the conditions laid down by imperialism and which breed new wars will be abolished by imperialism at any time it may choose.

The Paris peace treaties, signed after World War I by the imperialist countries, failed to prevent the initiation of World War II by the imperialist countries. After the end of World War II, German, Japanese, and Italian fascism was replaced by U. S. imperialism, which simply skipped the signing of a peace treaty, carried out arms expansion and war preparations more wantonly, and intensified its measures to make war and peace succeed each other alternately, in a fantastic attempt to fulfill its imperialist aim of dominating the world.

Of late, certain representative figures of the U. S. ruling group seem to be paying more lip service to peace than before, and playing more peace tricks. They have attempted to create an illusion in the minds of the people of the world that Eisenhower and his like can be "turned into Buddhas as soon as they lay down their butcher knives," as the saying has it, and that U. S. imperialism can bring peace to the world. Are Eisenhower and his kind likely to lay down their butcher

knives? Is U. S. imperialism truly seeking world peace?

Facts are most eloquent. Numerous facts have borne out that, while juggling with peace, Eisenhower and his like are making active preparations for war. We may do well to cite a few indisputable facts to bear out this point. The state of the union and budget messages delivered by Eisenhower this year to the U. S. Congress are not messages for peace, but rather messages for war; they are not messages for disarmament, but rather messages for arms expansion. Almost 60 percent—or more than 45 billion U. S. dollars—of the 1960 U. S. budget will be spent on arms expansion and war preparations. The recent hot debate conducted in the U. S. Congress and in newspapers controlled by the monopoly bourgeoisie was by no means a debate on the choice between peace and war, but rather a debate on how to expand arms. Eisenhower heinously declared that the United States "is in possession of all the strength needed to wipe out many countries." He clamored that the United States would devote all its efforts to developing a "true deterrent power" and to building more guided missiles and atomic submarines.

American Bases

The banners displayed by the two major U. S. bourgeois political parties, the Democratic and Republican parties, in their election campaigns are not banners for peace and the easing of world tension, but rather banners for carrying out arms expansion and war preparations more successfully. The United States is still maintaining more than 1 million of its armed forces in more than 70 foreign countries and areas. The United States has already established more than 250 military bases in foreign countries. It is intensifying the construction of IRBM and other guided-missile bases in foreign countries. More than 10 ICBM bases are now under construction in the United States.

Late in 1959, Eisenhower announced that the United States was at liberty to resume nuclear-weapons tests. The United States continually carried on military exercises, guided-missile tests, and underground non-nuclear explosion tests. Recently, it announced that underground nuclear-explosion tests would be conducted. This string of facts clearly shows that Eisenhower and his like will never lay down their butcher knives, and that, as an imperialist power, the United States will never abandon its policy of war.

The peace desired by U. S. imperialism

is a peace for U. S. domination of the whole globe. Neither Eisenhower today, nor Dulles in the past, has made any effort to hide the real meaning of their so-called "peace with justice." In their mind, the Socialist countries are "captive countries," all resolutions are "evil measures," and so-called "peace with justice" is a peace for the purpose of eliminating Socialism, of not permitting any revolution in any country, and of forcing all peoples of the world to submit to oppression and exploitation by U. S. monopoly capitalists.

In 1959, Eisenhower played a personal role in the comedy of "captive nations week." Recently, Herter, U. S. Secretary of State, issued a provocative statement, expressing the fantastic hope that the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics would one day "regain their national independence." And the national revolution of Iraq and the Cuban national liberation war are both taken by U. S. imperialism as "the armed conquest of the people" which it will not tolerate. In the eyes of the imperialists, "the model of world peace" can be found only in the mode of life of the United States. From this it can be seen that the "peace" demanded by the imperialists is the domination of the whole world by the United States—a new edition of the "peace" maintained by the Roman Empire in ancient history and by the British Empire in the 19th century.

"War Preparations"

Not long ago, the U. S. ruling quarters published reports drawn up by some leading research institutions on foreign and military policies. These reports arrive at the same conclusion—the United States must play peace tricks and actively prepare for war so as to carry out its imperialist policy. As is known to all, the United States is not now threatened by any power in the world. However, the U. S. imperialists have seen fit to make war preparations a matter of top priority in their national policy.

A report on U. S. foreign policy submitted by the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation—the biggest capitalist clique in the United States—says: "While seeking peace, the United States should bear squarely in mind the possibility of war. Is peace the total aim of our foreign policy, and must all matters be subordinate to this aim? The answer must be, no." A report on U. S. foreign policy submitted to the U. S. Senate by Johns Hopkins University, which is related to the

Morgan capital clique—another major clique in the United States—says: "There are still war possibilities. For this reason, we should have the strength to engage in nuclear warfare." A report by the Stanford Research Institute, which is related to the U. S. military authorities, says: "In view of the advances in technology, a situation may arise where the leader of a country must choose a nuclear war," and "we should have the power not only to prevent, but also, when necessary, to wage, war."

"For World Domination"

In publishing these three reports, the U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, an organ of U. S. monopoly bourgeoisie, says in its foreword: "Contests between world powers and between world power groups will inevitably deepen military and economic antagonism, which may lead to war."

This magazine regrets that "the United States lost its opportunity to dominate the whole world at the end of World War II." It offers the conclusion that, "only through world dominance by a single power can assurance of safety from nuclear war be established." This reveals, fully and flagrantly, the aim pursued by U. S. imperialism for world domination, the same old aim pursued by Hitler.

To realize its ambition for world hegemony, U. S. imperialism is, on the one hand, making active preparations for an overall war: that is, a world war; while, on the other hand, actively conducting and preparing for limited wars: that is, local wars. Eisenhower said: "To deal with situations not reaching the level of all-out nuclear war, we must continue to hold our aircraft carrier forces, our substantial armed forces abroad, our ever-ready army strategic forces, and marine divisions." The Rockefeller Foundation report says: "The United States must keep its military strength at all costs so that, by the time it must use armed forces to safeguard its vital interests, it will be able to wage total or local wars. The United States must not only keep its nuclear retaliation forces as a deterrent power against the Soviet Union, but also have sufficient armed forces to engage in non-nuclear wars."

The Stanford Research Institute report says: "In addition to strengthening its existing armed forces, the United States should have adequate civil defense forces and the capacity to carry out local wars." This is to say that, even if the United

States cannot launch major wars, it must launch medium-size and small wars; and even if it cannot launch nuclear wars, it must launch wars with conventional weapons. The Johns Hopkins University report even proposes to use nuclear weapons in so-called local wars. It says: "Following the development of the atom industry, the cost of fissionable materials will be reduced, thereby making more fissionable materials available. This will make it possible to use nuclear weapons in small wars."

The U. S. imperialists hold that the strategy of carrying on local wars on the basis of active preparations for a world war is most advantageous to them. They know that, with their great lag behind the Soviet Union in military science and technology, they will suffer extremely serious consequences in case they venture to start a world war. They are, however, neither willing nor able to abandon their policy of war. Thus, they have adopted the strategy of limited wars, with a view toward realizing, step by step, their imperialist aim by means of "local wars" short of a world war.

"Policy of Plunder"

The U. S. policy of local wars is a kind of conclusion drawn from its historical experiences in the pursuance of its policy of aggressive wars. It was through so-called local wars that the United States assumed control over the Western Hemisphere. The era of imperialism is a history full of local wars, besides the two world wars. World War II began with a series of local wars. From the end of World War II until today, there have been endless local wars started by the imperialists—the wars of imperialist intervention in the revolutions of other countries, the wars of imperialist suppression of the national liberation movements, and the wars of imperialist aggression against the Socialist countries. Although the imperialist countries have not yet fought directly among themselves, there is a serious latent danger of war. Wars of the aforesaid types are precisely products of the fundamental contradictions inherent in imperialism and the continuation of the various basic policies of U. S. imperialism.

After the war, U. S. imperialism adopted a most aggressive policy hostile to the people in the world. It crowned itself with the title of a "world policeman" responsible for suppressing national democratic revolutions in all colonies and semicolonies, and popular revolutions in all capitalist countries. It tried to realize

the policy of "western unity," forced other imperialist countries obediently to carry out the wishes of the United States, and even wildly attempted to wipe out the Socialist camp in order to fulfill its aim of world domination. It is precisely on account of the reactionary policy carried out by U. S. imperialism that the whole world has not only suffered from the actual disasters of so-called local wars engineered by U. S. imperialism, but has also been faced with the danger of a world war.

Facts show clearly that, as Lenin pointed out more than 40 years ago, the danger of war at present still lies in the imperialist system. **Imperialism is by nature predatory. The policies of the imperialist countries in time of "peace" are all for plunder. When these policies of plunder meet with obstacles and when such obstacles cannot be surmounted by "peaceful" means, imperialism resorts to war to remove these obstacles in order to continue its policy of plunder. The imperialist policy of plunder is bound to lead to war.**

There has been no change whatever in this characteristic of imperialism since the end of World War II. It is absolutely impermissible for us to mistake certain tactical changes on the part of imperialism for changes in the nature of imperialism. At one time imperialism may adopt tactics of this category; at another time, it may adopt tactics of that category. However, imperialism will never change its nature and basic policy. As long as imperialism exists, it will always exert itself to the full to realize its purpose of plunder, resorting principally to war at one time and to "peaceful" means at another. Only by clearly identifying the enemy of world peace can we have a clear-cut, concrete target in safeguarding peace and opposing war.

"No Change in Imperialism"

Although there has been no change in the nature of imperialism since World War II, the position of imperialism has undergone a great change. After World War I, the capitalist world enjoyed a relatively stable period. With the exception of the Socialist revolution in the Soviet Union, which was a success, the revolutions in all other countries ended in failure and colonialist imperialism was unbroken. After World War II, however, a powerful Socialist camp embracing 12 countries headed by the Soviet Union came into being, and a string of nation-ally independent countries emerged. The

old imperialist colonialist system was broken to bits.

In the capitalist world, which has shrunk a great deal due to the emergence of the Socialist world, the struggle between imperialism and colonial and semicolonial countries and people, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in imperialist countries, and between the imperialist countries themselves for raw material-producing areas and markets, has become more acute, more complex, and more intense than after World War I. However, this by no means warrants the conclusion that imperialism will no longer make war and that the root cause of modern war has been removed.

"Plundering the Colonies"

According to Leninist theory, the contradiction between imperialism on the one hand, and colonies and semicolonies on the other, are irreconcilable and antagonistic in nature. They constitute one of the root causes of modern war. Lenin said the imperialist countries "relied solely on constant, uninterrupted and never-ending wars to carry out their rule over hundreds of millions of inhabitants in their colonies. . . . The history of the 20th century—the century of 'rampant imperialism'—is full of colonial wars. . . . One of the most important characteristics of imperialism is that it speeds up the development of capitalism in the most backward countries, thereby expanding and intensifying the struggle against national oppression. This is a fact. From this the following conclusions must be drawn: Imperialism must often give rise to national wars. . . . In the era of imperialism, national wars waged by the colonies and semicolonies are not only possible but also inevitable. . . . The national wars waged by the colonies against imperialism will inevitably be a continuation of their national liberation policy." [Citations are made here to three different sources in Lenin's works.]

Are these truths of Lenin still applicable to the current situation? [One sentence indistinct.] Will imperialism voluntarily give up its plundering and control over its colonies and semicolonies so that the national liberation wars waged by these colonies and semicolonies will become unnecessary?

History since World War II shows all the more clearly the brilliance of Lenin's scientific thesis noted above. The disintegration of the old colonial system of imperialism does not mean that imperialism has given up its basic policy of colo-

niaism. With the support of the mighty Socialist camp, the struggles for national independence launched by many colonies which originally belonged to the imperialist countries have compelled imperialism to [several words indistinct]. However, it should be noted that the survival of imperialism depends on its obtaining reliable raw-material producing centers and markets. The traditional imperialist countries are still doing their best to maintain their interests among those nations which were colonies and semicolonies of imperialism in the past.

On the pretext of so-called "filling a vacuum," imperialism is penetrating these countries in every way. With U. S. support, West Germany and Japan, which are most anxious to acquire raw materials and markets, are also doing the same. Since World War II, the imperialist countries have carried on their trade by means of plundering the colonies; their proportion of the world's trade actually registered an increase as compared with that in the period before World War II. The proportion of Britain's trade in the "pound sterling area" and that of France in the "franc area" have shown no signs of reduction since World War II.

From 1947 through 1956, the new investment made by the United States in the so-called underdeveloped countries amounts to 7.4 billion dollars, but the United States plundered a total of 13.4 billion dollars in profits from these so-called underdeveloped countries. The so-called foreign aid carried out by U. S. imperialism since World War II is, in a different way, a capital export of an extremely aggressive nature. Through the large amount of loans allocated to [words indistinct], in an attempt to enslave other capitalist countries, and colonies and semicolonies.

"Three Kinds of War"

Since World War II, the colonial rule of imperialism, aside from maintaining the old colonial system to some extent, has been chiefly carried out on the pretext of supporting or [granting?] independence. This activity has taken one of two forms: The first is to have the politics, military affairs, and finances of a country controlled by an imperialist nation, the U. S. control over many Latin American countries being an example; the other is to have a country under the control of several imperialist nations, as was the case with China before its liberation.

Countries under these two forms of control have the characteristics of semicolonies, as pointed out by Lenin. In such

countries the struggles waged by the broad masses of the people—including the national bourgeoisie on certain occasions—against imperialism and its running dogs have become intensified and more acute, instead of stopping.

In point of fact, three different kinds of wars have broken out between imperialism on the one hand and colonies and semicolonies on the other. The first is the war launched by imperialism to suppress colonies; the second is the imperialist war of aggression against countries which have achieved national independence; the third is the national liberation war carried out in the form of a civil war to oppose imperialism and its running dogs. All three kinds of war have been unceasing and are still being carried out both separately and simultaneously.

"The Way Out Through Socialism"

According to Leninist theory, the contradictions between the monopoly capitalist class and the broad masses of the people within an imperialist country are irreconcilable and antagonistic in nature and constitute one of the root causes of modern war. Lenin once said: "Imperialism is an era of financial capital and financial monopoly. Financial capital and financial monopoly have brought about a trend of rule to each locality and not a trend of freedom. This trend of rule will result in an all-round reaction against every political system and in more acute contradictions in political system."

Lenin held this viewpoint: "Only by means of launching a proletarian Socialist revolution, will it be possible to emancipate mankind from the hopeless situation caused by imperialism and the imperialist wars. Despite the extreme difficulties, or possible and temporary defeat in launching the revolution, and the intensified resistance against the revolution, the final victory of the proletariat is inevitable." Lenin also pointed out: "Civil wars are also wars. Whoever recognizes the class struggle cannot fail to recognize civil wars which in every class of society constitute the natural, and under certain conditions, inevitable continuation, development, and intensification of the class struggle. All the great revolutions prove this. To repudiate civil war, or to forget about it, would mean sinking into extreme opportunism and renouncing the Socialist revolution."

Is there any relaxation in the contradictions today between the monopoly

capitalist class and the broad masses of the people in an imperialist country? Has the imperialist system become "people's capitalism" and even reached the point "nearest to the Communist ideal of prosperity for all" so that the above-mentioned theory of Lenin no longer holds good, as claimed by the imperialists? The history of the 15 postwar years also bears out more clearly than ever the brilliance of this scientific thesis of Lenin cited above. In the imperialist countries, the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production have sharpened. The imperialist system has become more reactionary in an overall manner and even developed toward the militarization of national economies, thereby seriously restricting society's productive forces. Because of the imperialist rule, modern sciences and techniques cannot serve to benefit the broad masses. On the contrary, they have become a burden and threat to the masses. Authority and power in the imperialist countries have increased tremendously, as is first of all illustrated in the efforts to further intensify military organizations to suppress the masses.

The imperialist countries have also consolidated the so-called "role of economic adjustment," which is chiefly illustrated in the direct control of State organs by the monopoly capitalists and in their high offices in government organizations, thereby further intensifying their exploitation of the masses of people.

Eisenhower's government is notably a cabinet of wealthy men. All the imperialist governments today are still controlled by some type of financial oligarchy as before World War II. For instance, the real power of the Adenauer government in West Germany is held by the same group of financial magnates who controlled the Hitler government in the past. The struggle among the cliques of U. S. monopoly capital has also sharpened. The cycle of economic crisis in imperialist countries has shortened; the frequency of economic crises has also increased and events are moving toward an inevitable crisis of greater seriousness. Some of the signs of "prosperity" are also chiefly built on the basis of the military race and other factors of a temporary nature.

The monopoly capital headed by the United States has been greatly [developing?] in the postwar years. The proportion of sales of 200 major manufacturing enterprises in the total volume of sales of the manufacturing industry increased from 37.7 percent in 1935, to 45.5 percent in 1955, while the net profits of U. S. monopoly capital [word indistinct] tax deduc-

tion increased from 6.2 billion dollars in 1937 to 37.1 billion dollars in 1958.

The parasitic and degenerating nature of U. S. monopoly capital has also been developed. Three-fourths of the U. S. State budget is spent on payments of previous and current military expenditure, whereas more than one-fourth of U. S. industry produces munitions. In 1959, every American citizen bore an average of 291 dollars in military expenditure. The U. S. tax revenue has exceeded one-fourth of the people's income, while the amount of federal bonds has also reached nearly 300 billion dollars. The American people cannot but be dissatisfied and opposed to such heavy burdens. The outwardly powerful U. S. economy is just like a building constructed on a sand beach which faces a constant danger of collapse.

Although the temporary signs of "prosperity" have expanded the illusion of reformism among a certain number of workers in the capitalist countries, yet there still exist increasingly acute contradictions not only between the bourgeoisie and the working class, but also between the monopoly capitalist class and all sections of the people, between the U. S. monopoly bourgeoisie and the people, and even between the U. S. bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie in other capitalist countries.

It is exactly as was pointed out in the declaration of the Moscow conference of the Communist and workers' parties of Socialist countries held in 1957: "The current conditions of the working people in capitalist countries have enabled them to believe more and more that the only way out of their grave situation lies through Socialism. Thus, increasingly favorable conditions are being created to bring them into the active struggle for Socialism."

"Inevitability of Revolutions"

With regard to the means of realizing the transition from capitalism to Socialism by each country, it is the internal affair of each country and naturally will be decided by the people of each country. The Socialist countries will absolutely not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Revolution cannot be exported. The inevitability of revolutions in the capitalist countries is an objective law of history and independent of human will. In the event of a revolution, no one can guarantee that the counterrevolutionaries will not use violence to suppress it. The Marxist-Leninist Parties do not reject peaceful means for carrying out revolution, but

when the exploiting class uses violence against the people, the possibility of employing the other means has to be considered, namely, the transition to Socialism by nonpeaceful means. The historical experience of mankind shows that the ruling class will not give up State power of its own accord. It is exactly as was pointed out in the Moscow conference declaration: "In this case, the degree of bitterness and the forms of the class struggle will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance put up by the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, and on these circles' using force at one or another stage of the struggle for Socialism."

According to the Leninist theory, the contradictions between the imperialist countries are irreconcilable and antagonistic in nature and constitute one of the root causes of modern wars. Lenin said: **"Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism."** **"The better developed capitalism becomes, the more acute shortages of raw materials and the struggle for competing and pursuing the sources of raw materials will be."** **"Without a forcible redivision of the colonies, the new imperialist countries cannot obtain the privileges enjoyed by the older imperialist powers."** **"Imperialist-waged wars for obtaining world domination, markets for banking capital, and for strangling the small and weaker nations, are inevitable."** [Citations are made here to four different sources in Lenin's works.]

"The Struggle for Markets"

Is not the above principle of Lenin still applicable to the current situation? May we say that, after World War II, the United States has assumed an outstanding position in the imperialist camp and that all other imperialist countries will forever be subservient to the United States? Will the struggle among the imperialist countries for raw materials and markets be slowed down? Has the danger of war among the imperialist countries become nonexistent?

Fifteen years after the war, facts have proved the brilliance of the above scientific conclusion of Lenin. The struggle among the imperialist countries for raw materials and markets, instead of slowing down, has become more acute, because the market of the imperialist world has greatly shrunk and semicolonial rule has aggravated the struggle of the imperialist countries for markets.

Everyone knows that, of the total volume of export of industrial goods of the

imperialist countries, that of the United States occupied only 11 percent in 1899, but it rose to nearly 20 percent in 1937. During World War II and the years that followed the War, U. S. imperialism exercised virtual monopoly over the export of industrial goods of the entire capitalist world. However, the good dreams of the United States were ephemeral. In the words of Dulles, "The ideal of Western unity is still just an ideal." Although the United States has spent tens of billions of U.S. dollars, yet "the European rehabilitation plan has not turned out exactly in the way we expected, nor has it attained the aim which we have reason to expect."

The strife among the imperialist bloc has been great; an acute struggle for raw materials and markets has been going on. In 1950 the industrial goods exported by the United States dropped to 27 percent of the total volume of export of industrial goods of the imperialist countries, reaching as low as 22 percent in the second quarter of 1959. Recently, the U. S. Government has been applying pressure on capitalist countries, demanding that they remove the restrictions on the import of U. S. goods. At the same time, with the support of the United States, West Germany and France have organized a joint European market, thus keeping Britain out. To counter the measure, Britain has formed a free trade zone in Europe.

Negotiations in the past several years have not solved the deadlock of such an acute struggle. The export of industrial goods of the once renowned Great Britain dropped to 18 percent of the total volume of export of industrial goods of the imperialist countries, as compared with one-third of the total volume in 1899. Of course, British imperialism has been trying hard to save itself from its present dwindling situation and has made some little progress in recent years. But what is especially worthy of attention is that, with the support of the United States, the volume of export of industrial goods of West Germany has exceeded that of Britain, reaching 18.8 percent in the second quarter of 1959. That was the third time in history that the export of industrial goods from Germany exceeded that of Britain. The first time was in 1913 on eve of World War I; the second time was in 1937 on the eve of World War II. This fact alone should arouse the vigilance of the people.

Similarly, with the support of the United States, Japanese imperialism has again become a competitor on the world market. In 1937, Japan's volume of export of industrial goods occupied about

7 percent of the total volume of the imperialist countries, and was already restored to over 6 percent in the second quarter of 1959. But this figure still fell far short of the expectations of the Japanese monopoly capitalists. The spearhead of Japan's struggle for markets is directed toward Southeast Asia. The Japanese monopoly capitalists have resorted to all ways and means for exporting capital to Southeast Asia, occupying the market there, and grabbing resources.

"Driven Mad by Greed"

The resurgence of imperialism in West Germany and Japan has occasioned a serious threat of war. The United States will certainly get into trouble by helping West Germany and Japan. West Germany and Japan have already become two strong competitors with the United States in the grabbing of markets. The recent news that West Germany is building military bases in Spain and preparing for nuclear-weapons tests is another ill omen. West Germany has even tried to set up military bases on the soil of Britain proper, in collaboration with the reactionary rulers of Britain. During World War II, German troops failed to land in the British isles, but are trying now to land in Britain smoothly without resorting to war.

The U. S. monopolistic bourgeoisie, driven mad by greed and high profits, have long ago forgotten the lessons of World War II. According to the wishful thinking of the United States, a rearmend West Germany would become the mainstay in a war against the Soviet Union in the West, and Japan the mainstay in a war against China in the East. As a matter of fact, did not the United States, Britain, and France try to utilize Germany and Japan to engage in war against the Soviet Union before World War II? Nevertheless, the development of history is independent of their wishes. The person who originally planned to "kill someone by borrowing the knife of another person," was himself first wounded by the knife.

In this respect, what difference is there between the situation today and that before World War II? The only difference is that the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union has become stronger than ever. Anyone who starts any war against Socialist countries will only dig his own grave. Actually, the ruling classes in these countries also know that if they do not initiate any attack on the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp, the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp will firmly adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence

and will never launch any attack against them. Water always flows from a high place to a lower place.

To bully the weak and yield before the strong is a special feature of imperialism. Raw materials and markets are the source of life of imperialist countries. They will resort to every means to grab raw materials and markets. World War I was a war among the imperialist countries; World War II also started among the imperialist countries themselves. West Germany and Japan, which have risen with the help of the United States, will not obey the directions of the United States. Who can guarantee that West Germany and Japan will not tread their old path? Again, who can guarantee that West Germany will not launch a new war of aggression in the West and Japan will not launch a new war of aggression in Southeast Asia? Furthermore, who can guarantee that there will not be a recurrence of the Pearl Harbor incident, or that there will not be a new world war among the imperialist countries?

As early as 1945, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the real and direct contradictions of the world after the war were the growing internal contradictions of the capitalist world itself; that is, the contradictions between the reactionary cliques of an imperialist country and its own people, the contradictions between the imperialist countries and their colonies and semicolonies, and the contradictions among the imperialist countries. The real and direct contradictions of the world since the war are not contradictions between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union and the United States can and are actually coexisting peacefully. The imperialist reactionary cliques are only using the rumor that war between the Soviet Union and the United States may break out at any moment as a smokescreen to hide their schemes to control the world and apply pressure on their own people.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said: "The propaganda of war against the Soviet Union includes two aspects. On the one hand, U. S. imperialism is actually preparing for war against the Soviet Union, the current propaganda of war against the Soviet Union and other anti-USSR propaganda being political preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, such propaganda is a smokescreen used by the U. S. reactionary cliques for covering up the many actual contradictions directly faced by U. S. imperialism at present. These include contradictions between the U. S. reactionary cliques and the American

people, and contradictions between U. S. imperialism and other imperialist countries and their colonies and semicolonies.

"At present, the U. S. slogans calling for anti-Soviet war actually mean the oppression of the American people and the expansion of the U. S. aggressive forces in the capitalist world." The correctness of this great prediction by Comrade Mao Tse-tung is now clearer than ever.

Precisely because the imperialist system is the source of modern wars and the imperialist forces of war headed by the United States are daily creating dangers of war, the people of the whole world must assume the obligation of struggling for peace. The struggle for peace is an extremely complicated and difficult task. When the working class took power following the October Revolution, Lenin said: "Now the struggle for peace has started. This is a difficult struggle. Whoever has thought that it is easy to attain peace, that one has only to mention the word peace and the bourgeoisie will present it on a silver platter, is a very naive person."

"Know the Enemy"

A very great and fundamental change has taken place in the correlation of forces between the enemy and us since Lenin made this statement. However, imperialism is, after all, imperialism, and monopoly capital is, after all, monopoly capital. Under such circumstances, the peace needed by the people of the whole world cannot be won if we beg it of imperialism instead of rallying all people to the struggle for defending peace and opposing imperialist war so as to tie the hands and feet of the imperialist forces of war.

We must acquire a correct understanding of the objective law that imperialism breeds war precisely for the purpose of using this law to oppose, prevent, and eliminate imperialist war. We must expose the inherent predatory nature of imperialism and its policy of plunder. Imperialism has used peace and war in its doubledealing, [about 50 fifty words indistinct]. All this is designed to heighten the vigilance of the people and to wage a struggle directly against imperialism. "Know the enemy and know yourself, and it is a winning battle you will fight." The more thoroughly we know imperialism, the easier it will be to achieve our aim of shattering the war schemes of imperialism and defending peace.

In all countries of the world, with the exception of a few monopolistic bourgeoisie and their lackeys, the broad masses

of people of all strata aspire for world peace and are against imperialist wars. Therefore, the struggle for peace in an extremely extensive mass movement. It is entirely possible for us to mobilize all people who can be mobilized to take part in this movement so as to completely isolate the imperialist forces of war. In order to struggle for and realize world peace, we must wage a struggle against the imperialist policies of aggression and plunder. In the colonial and semicolonial countries, the unswerving struggle of the broad masses of oppressed people for complete national independence and against the old and new forms of colonialism constitutes an important, indispensable force in the peace movement.

One of the special features since World War II has been the surging movement for national independence in colonial and semicolonial States and the continual suppression and use of force by imperialism to smother the movement. The leftover flames of war originate from the imperialist system. The spearhead of U. S. aggression at present is directed primarily against these colonial and semicolonial States and independent countries. In order to realize world peace, the people of the whole world should support the national independence movements of the colonial and semicolonial States, support the just struggles of the independent countries against imperialism, support the just wars for national liberation and against imperialist aggression, and extinguish the flames of war kindled by imperialism in these areas, so as to closely associate these struggles with the struggle for world peace.

In the imperialist countries, the resolute struggles carried out by the broad masses of people led by the working class for peace and people's democracy constitute an important, indispensable force in the peace movement. The broad masses of people of the imperialist countries, after having experienced the sufferings brought about by the world wars, do not wish for any more wars. Thus, the enemies of world peace have found themselves regularly encircled by the broad masses of people of their own countries. The people in West Germany are daily intensifying their struggle against remilitarization. In Japan, the struggle against the "Japanese-U. S. security treaty" is spreading across the length and breadth of the country. The struggles of the people in the United States, Britain, France, and Italy, against the rule by monopolistic bourgeoisie and the militarization and enslavement plans of their bourgeois governments are continuing to develop. The combined strength

of these struggles will play an increasingly greater role in checking the war preparations and activities of the imperialist forces of war.

"The Struggle for Peace"

The consolidation, development, and unity of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union provides a fundamental guarantee for peace. The Socialist countries are rapidly developing their own economic power. The Soviet Union has left the United States far behind in the most advanced fields of science and military techniques. Our task is to rally around us all peace-loving forces of the world and to make the east wind prevail more overwhelmingly over the west wind. With this, imperialism will not dare to launch a reckless attack on the Socialist countries and will have to think twice before unleashing a war in any other part of the world. The struggle for peace is not an isolated one. Only the combined victories of all struggles can halt the criminal plan of imperialism for unleashing a world war.

We must see that, even though imperialism does not unleash a world war, it may start localized wars in certain areas when opportunities come up. Experience from history has told us that a so-called localized war carried out by imperialism may develop on a growing scale if the forces of peace cannot speedily halt it or fail to shatter the imperialist schemes for which the war has been started.

Experience from history has also told us that, if only the masses of people would exercise high vigilance, continually develop and expand their forces in safeguarding world peace, and have the courage to carry out heroic struggles against imperialism which has made preparations for starting local wars, imperialism would be obliged to think twice before it would do so. If this is done, the flames of war will be extinguished even after they are ignited.

Since World War II, with the support of the great force of world peace, the Chinese and Korean people joined hands to smash the U. S. scheme of aggression against Korea, the Egyptian people shattered the imperialist plan of aggression, the imperialist plan for overthrowing the Hungarian people's democratic system with counterrevolutionary forces was met with an ignominious defeat, the U. S. and British imperialist scheme

for aggression against Lebanon and Jordan and for suppressing the Iraqi national revolution was met with a similar ignominious defeat, and U. S. imperialism dared not to start a war of aggression against Cuba in the face of the courageous, united Cuban people. All this shows that, by carrying out resolute struggles, the great force for safeguarding world peace can put local wars started by imperialism to a prompt end, and thwart the imperialist plans for enlarging local wars.

Just as pointed out in the Moscow conference declaration: "At present, the force of peace has grown to substantial proportions. It is now realistically possible for it to prevent war." This viewpoint has fully been borne out by facts. To win peace, it is necessary to urge the people of the world to develop a will to struggle to insure peace. This is the way for winning peace taught us by great Lenin.

"Peaceful Coexistence"

Together with all Socialist countries, the government and people of our country firmly stand for the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. We warmly welcome the easing of international tension. We firmly stand for universal disarmament and the prohibition of the testing and use of nuclear weapons. We hold that the two major camps should sign a nonaggression pact. The Chinese Government has consistently supported Comrade Khrushchev for his efforts toward the convocation of an East-West summit conference and for his other peace proposals. The materialization of these proposals will be beneficial to the Socialist construction program of our country, to the entire Socialist camp, and to all the peace loving countries and peoples in the whole world.

The peaceful coexistence policy was advanced by Lenin at a time when a Socialist country came into being, imperialism still existed, and a certain balance of power was established. It goes without saying that, while practicing peaceful coexistence, there will still be much struggle between Socialism and imperialism. The Socialist countries will faithfully carry out a peace policy. They will by no means carry out aggression against any country. The imperialist countries, however, are given to the habit of aggression. They will torpedo peaceful coexistence whenever they have the opportunity. For this reason, on the acceptance of the peaceful

coexistence policy by imperialism, Lenin told us: "We must bear in mind that we are faced at all times with the danger of being attacked. We must try our utmost to prevent the occurrence of any such disaster."

Today, the question is no longer the balance of power achieved by Socialism against imperialism, but rather that Socialism has attained superiority over imperialism with the east wind prevailing over the west wind, and is in a position to force imperialism to accept peaceful coexistence. However, we must bear in mind Lenin's teaching that "we are surrounded by people, classes, and governments who openly express the greatest hatred for us."

Today, U. S. imperialism is surrounding us with a network of military bases and guided missiles. We must maintain the highest possible vigilance against the dangers of war created by imperialism. Just as was pointed out in the Moscow conference declaration: "As long as there is imperialism, there will be soil for unleashing wars of aggression."

We have full confidence in shattering the war plan of imperialism. But should we be afraid if the war maniacs, against the will of the people of the world, unleash a war? Comrade Mao Tse-tung has given a Marxist-Leninist reply to this question in his work "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." He said: "**We stand resolutely for peace and oppose war. But if the imperialists insist on unleashing another war, we should not be afraid of it. Our attitude on this question is the same as our attitude toward all 'disturbances': 1) we are against it; 2) we are not afraid of it.** World War I was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union with a population of 200 million. World War II was followed by the emergence of the Socialist camp with a combined population of 900 million. If the imperialists should insist on launching a third world war, it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to Socialism. Then there will not be much room left in the world for the imperialists, while it is quite likely that the whole structure of imperialism will utterly collapse."

All peace-loving people in the world, unite! Heighten your vigilance and carry out your struggle! If only we can thwart the imperialist plans for plunder and enslavement, we shall most assuredly be able to continue to check imperialist wars, preserve world peace, and advance toward the goal of winning a lasting peace.

Book Review

An Answer to Marx?

THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, by W. W. Rostow, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 179 pp. Cloth \$3.75; paper \$1.45.

GEORGE ROSEN

PROFESSOR ROSTOW has written one of the most important books in political economy in recent years. It is, in the first place, an economic historian's appraisal of where the world is going and what it needs to get there. Marxists have maintained that the underdeveloped countries in the southern hemisphere will find their future in an imitation of the Soviet pattern of economic growth. Premier Khrushchev's exploitation of Soviet successes, coupled with his challenge to the West to engage with the Communist countries in "peaceful competition," have confronted the Western public with duties and problems that are new in its political philosophy.

Rostow, who has written several outstanding works in his academic field, addresses himself in this book to answering the Marxist thesis for an audience of intelligent laymen concerned with the political and economic development of the "uncommitted countries." He subtitles his book "A Non-Communist Manifesto," and if this manifesto is a good deal longer than the one of Marx and Engels—with its ominous opening, "A specter is haunting Europe," and its hortatory ending, "Workingmen of all countries, unite!"—it is still an adventure to read. Before publication, the book

had already excited some hot debate in England and the United States, based on a summary published last fall in the *London Economist*. The author has also expounded some of it to an academic audience in Moscow. This reviewer can only hope that the debate will continue, for Rostow has produced an argument that deserves all the attention the public can give it.

The economic thesis of the book can be summarized briefly: in the course of their development all societies pass through five stages. The first is the *traditional society*, which Rostow describes as one in which the methods of science have not yet been applied to the increase of economic efficiency, in which agriculture is the most important occupation, and in which political power rests in the hands of landowners. Then the forces making for change begin to develop, either because of accumulating domestic stresses and strains or—as is more common today—under the pressure of a foreign threat, whether real or imagined. This is the *preconditions* period when attitudes, leaders, resources, and institutions (economic and political) are in a state of flux and economic risk-taking begins to appear. Then comes the most dramatic stage of the five—for which the author uses the term "*the take-off*." The forces making for change break through the crust of tradition, first in individual sectors and then throughout the economy. In this period the rate of effective saving and investment

rises from about 5% to about 15% of the national income; and the economy develops a permanent tendency to grow. "Growth becomes its normal condition. Compound interest becomes built, as it were, into its habits and institutional structure."

The take-off normally starts in a few leading sectors, but gradually spreads throughout the economy, and—after a period of about 60 years—the economy reaches *maturity*. This is the period in which the economy "demonstrates that it has the technological and entrepreneurial skills to produce . . . anything that it chooses to produce." The fifth and final stage, the *mass-consumption stage*, is one of high incomes and high consumption, but it is also the period when technological advancement and reinvestment lose some of their importance and the society can choose other goals than simply to grow. It may devote a larger share of resources to social welfare, or—as in the United States recently—to the production of babies.

The "Inscrutable West"

This summary cannot do justice to some of the economic insights of the book. There are interesting observations on the great depression of the Thirties, and on the affluent society of the Fifties in the United States, as well as on the economies of Russia, Japan and Sweden. Rostow maintains that Russian economic growth since 1870 has shown a trend parallel to that of the United States (with the exception of war, postwar and depression years). Total industrial production in Russia has lagged about

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35 years, and per capita output about 55 years, behind that of the United States; the USSR is now approaching the mass-consumption stage which the United States reached in about 1925. Rostow feels that the Russian "challenge" to the United States has arisen from two factors: the Russians have channelled a much larger proportion of their growing scientific capacity and industrial production into the field of armament; and total industrial production in the United States has been allowed to stagnate in recent years. The problem is basically not one of Russian growth, but of the West's reluctance to take steps that would allow the potentially high rate of growth to materialize, and also to mobilize its greater resources to meet the Russian challenge at home and abroad. "The problem lies not in the mysterious East, but in the inscrutable West."

After describing his economic "stages," Rostow uses them to explain certain of the major political events of the period since 1800. The *pre-conditions* and *take-off* stages are normally periods of new political leadership, with strong nationalistic tendencies; the new political leaders may flex their nationalistic muscles either for purposes of internal consolidation or for aggression against their neighbors (partly to ease internal difficulties). The aggressiveness may diminish as a country's energies are absorbed by internal growth. But as a country approaches economic maturity it becomes capable of challenging the international leadership of other countries, and it may find an opportunity if a political vacuum exists in areas which have lagged economically and have been politically chaotic. Among the factors making for world conflict since 1914 have been the challenges of maturing powers—Germany, Japan and now Russia—to the older powers for control of Eastern Europe and China; the "mature" economies of the older powers had failed to maintain their momentum or had shown other weaknesses.

A new factor since World War II is the development of the mass-destruction weapons. Their effect has been to diffuse rather than concen-

trate power among nations. Although the United States and Russia seem superficially to hold world power in their hands, Rostow believes that the nuclear stalemate and the fear of total destruction have given greater bargaining power to the smaller countries. The larger countries fear to exploit their power lest it lead to a major war. Power will become still further diffused as the newly industrializing countries expand their own military potential—*assuming always that no one country ever achieves a dominance of nuclear power*. Rostow thinks the Russians pursued world primacy in the recent past. However, he believes the Russian leadership is now aware that this goal is becoming ever more difficult to achieve and is debating whether to give up this goal and use the resources now devoted to armament for other purposes—for example, the production of consumer goods. He feels that if the political controls which make possible great military expenditures were relaxed, the type of government presently existing in Russia would wither away in a popular demand for more goods and more freedom. Thus to Rostow the problem for the West is to persuade Russia that there is no chance of achieving world primacy because the underdeveloped countries are not a potential area for Communist expansion. The West must help these countries to develop in a democratic, non-Communist fashion.

It is easier to state what is required for development than to carry it out. According to Rostow it involves such problems as: "how to persuade the peasant to change his methods and shift to producing for wider markets; how to build up a corps of technicians, capable of manipulating the new techniques; how to create a corps of entrepreneurs, oriented not toward large profit margins at existing levels of output and technique, but to expanded output, under a regime of regular technological change and obsolescence; how to create a modern professional civil and military service . . . oriented to the welfare of the nation and to standards of efficient performance, rather than to graft and to ties of family, clan, or religion." Communism has great appeal for the

underdeveloped countries in process of transition; and "it is in such a setting that a centralized dictatorship may supply an essential technical precondition for take-off and a sustained drive to maturity; an effective modern state organization. . . . For those who would prefer to see the aspiring societies of the world not follow this particular road to modernization . . . the Communist technique poses a formidable problem, almost certainly what historians will judge the central challenge of our time; that is the challenge of creating, in association with the non-Communist politicians and people of the preconditions and early take-off areas, a partnership which will see them through into sustained growth on a political and social basis which keeps open the possibilities of progressive, democratic development."

Rostow sets up three major targets of public policy toward the underdeveloped countries. First, it is necessary to increase agricultural productivity at a more rapid rate than previously, and all the more so because populations are increasing. He sees this as primarily a technical problem of diffusing new methods, as well as making new fertilizers, seeds, etc., available. Second, the developed countries must organize their aid programs on an enlarged and more stable basis; making these programs stable will help to assure the new political leaders of continuous support and deter them from foreign adventures. Finally, the leaders in the transitional societies must focus their efforts on economic development, and assume the necessary responsibility and initiative for economic growth within a framework of political freedom.

Knowledge and Politics

Professor Rostow's book has an exhilarating sweep; like any provocative treatment of history, it suggests new insights into the past and new approaches to the present. But the very breadth of it has resulted in certain simplifications which a reviewer is bound to point out. For one thing, Rostow's economic societies seem to move a little too easily from one stage of their development to the next. Once the "take-off" has begun, there seems

to be nothing to prevent the economy from moving by compound interest toward its final destination of relative affluence. Yet in the past economies have started to industrialize but have not taken off; or they have bounced along indefinitely without achieving a significant increase in national income per capita. Rostow does not discuss this possibility in any detail, yet this may be crucial in many underdeveloped countries. The success of the "take-off" can be determined only in the fairly long run, after policies and programs have become thoroughly established and perhaps not susceptible to change. Rostow, of course, realizes the difficulties—he mentions the possibility of conflict within leadership groups and the chance that they may turn to foreign adventure as a way out—but these are not treated at any length and analyzed as they deserve.

Other problems arise in the field of agriculture, to which Rostow properly assigns key importance in preparing the way for the industrial "take-off." Until an economy has reached a stage where it can raise the largest part of the resources for industrial growth from its own output—i.e., largely from agriculture—the "take-off" will not be possible. The program may call for production policies, tax policies, new forms of rural organization, and other steps that would be unwelcome to major groups in a traditional society. Rostow ignores these problems in his discussion of raising farm output. Here it must be conceded that Marx's political analysis is of some importance. The structure of a society, whether as simple as that outlined by Marx, or more complex, may strongly influence the political leadership and the steps it takes to increase agricultural output; if a dominant land-owning group is sufficiently strong it can thwart desirable policies which threaten its social, economic and political position. While Rostow, in his discussion of Marx, accepts class interests as being of great importance he does not embody them in his theory; even if Marx over-emphasized them, they cannot be ignored. Gunnar Myrdal has said somewhere that no country ever successfully industrialized without a

social and economic revolution—often peaceful—in the agricultural sector. This is far too large a problem in the political economy of growth to be treated in a few concluding paragraphs.

Rostow also appears to identify the stages of development with industrial growth. He states, for example, that in some countries the "take-off was delayed . . . by the high (and even expanding) levels of welfare that could be achieved by exploiting land and natural resources." In the table at the start of the book, Canada and Australia are shown to have reached the mass-consumption stage prior to maturity. It may well pay a particular country, given its available natural resources and the world terms of trade, to specialize in agricultural or mineral output, and to import manufactured goods. Denmark is an economically mature economy, even though, or just because, it is the larder for Great Britain; Japan did not really start to diversify its economy beyond agriculture, silk output and textiles until the 1930s when military demand and a shift in the terms of trade against raw material products made the production of machinery and other goods economic. It may possibly never be to the advantage of a country to shift from producing, say, oil to producing manufactured goods; it may be preferable to import manufactures from other countries. Rostow ignores what economists call "terms-of-trade effects," and he does not deal at all with the implications for world trade if the underdeveloped countries were to become major industrial producers and potential exporters of manufactured goods. It might then, for example, be to the advantage of some of the older industrial countries to shift their economic structure toward agriculture or minerals, and to import manufactured products.

With respect to the political future of the underdeveloped countries and of Russia, Rostow seems heavily influenced by his American background. The changes he envisages in the organization and social attitudes of the populations of the underdeveloped countries (see the paragraph quoted earlier) correspond to those that have

occurred in the United States. Such changes in attitude may occur—on the other hand, certain societies, most notably Japan, have retained many of their traditional family and social attitudes, even in the modern factory, and American concepts of "productivity" have little meaning in that context. It would not be surprising if the Japanese pattern were to be followed in other countries. Thus India may conceivably not eliminate its caste system but modify it in the context of an urban, factory-centered, society with universal suffrage. Similarly, the alternative in Russia may not be a mass-consumption democracy. In other countries of the world there may exist a whole range of political alternatives that have little relation to the experience or theory of the West, including that of Marxism.

How does Rostow's theory compare with that of Marx? Essentially the broad area of disagreement is that Marx proceeds from the viewpoint of economic determinism, while Rostow accepts the fact that the reasons for human behavior are far too complex to be explained on purely economic grounds. Both human and social behavior reflect numerous factors, and any given act represents a balance among those factors—social, political, religious and psychological, as well as economic. One may certainly agree with Rostow in this—and in the desirability of a humane society where various interests can have their play. Rostow is quite correct in stressing the importance of economic development and the desirability of an expanded and stabilized economic assistance program by the developed countries. This may well be the most important problem of foreign policy for the United States in the future. But Rostow's somewhat mechanistic stage theory has a weakness which that of Marx does not—it tends to gloss over the difficulties of growth, especially those resulting from economic and political conflicts within the underdeveloped countries. An economic aid program can assist in a transition period, but the aiding country is better aware of the problems and difficulties if it recognizes some of the group conflicts that Marx stressed.

JESTS (continued from page 25)

will always find something where there's nothing. No one backed you up at the meeting?"

"No, no one."

"Perhaps it would be best not to wait but find you a job here, in Warsaw, right away? You're a chemistry graduate, aren't you?"

"Yes. But I . . . thank you very much . . . I don't. . ."

Gerard moved his chair to where their knees touched.

"Why not? You really wouldn't want to live in Warsaw?"

"Of course, I would," she felt as if betrayed into the cool, irrevocable hands of the surgeon, she could not explain to him, perhaps to no one, why she should remain with what had been begun, whatever the chances, she did not know how to say it, because up to now verbal description of clear-cut matters had not been necessary, she never did it, she only did what she had to, about which there was no doubt that she had to—and now this necessity found her unprepared, stammering like a little girl.

"You wouldn't stay, Lutek or not?" Gerard said.

Flying skirts swept across the little end table, knocking an ashtray to the floor, Veronica's rise from her chair had been too panicky, she poured cognac: "It's excellent, from Georgia. It won't take more than a second to clean. It's nothing, broken glass brings good luck," while simultaneously thinking several instantaneously born sentences which mounted, jostled and did not end: *Lutec says he's a drunk. He goes for me. He knows something more than I, more than Lucjan. He knows something that's loaded, something that hasn't happened yet . . . That's what he's looking at with those crossed, unmoving eyes of a badly stuffed bird. He knows, a few sentences, mixed and hardened into a petrified landscape never to be deciphered.*

III

She was returning home alone, a young woman in a light blue raincoat with plaster-taped elbow, along the only street of this community, or suburb, leaves shrouded the cracked pavement of the sidewalk and on the driveway

children ran after chestnuts calling to one another in low, throaty voices. Wind blew strands of hair into the woman's face drawn with the effort of understanding and reluctance which, perhaps, was born of knowledge of the unaptness of effort in general, and not because she couldn't make it, although she probably couldn't. Gerard left after having had several talks, he had no intention of writing about human interest which interested no one, whatever he said to her, she knew, expressly because that interest, right here, had no advocate, she did not hold it against him, he arrived and departed, he came from somewhere else completely, she also believed him when he said that Lucjan had placed a bet with his friends on her love ready to come running at the slightest sign from him, if the song expressed truth, he did not want to know her, he was not strong enough for her. The "Bristol" evening constituted a realization of victory, *ah, yes*, she repeated, *ah, yes*, and Gerard's graceless assurances could not pierce the amazement beneath which she stood, as if under a high wall; this amazement still lasted, a dulling background for the question, *what next*, and anyway, she also didn't know which was the background and which the leading motif and if anyone were to look at her face they would wonder how this girl can walk so rapidly and decisively and her black, overly thin-heeled shoes avoid so unerringly all the ruts in the road. But it was not the hour of work's beginning—which to others is the end—no one walked the street in either direction, only kids chased around in the road and near the fence a cat, elongated in flight, leaped over the shadow of a bird. Mrs. Kubik was hanging out diapers on a line stretched between window and rickety cherry tree, turning, she said:

"I can't play the radio. The Potelskis keep unscrewing the fuses," her hand, sunk in a bowlful of white rags, remained motionless, "let her tell you herself what else is there I can enjoy . . ."

Veronica stopped and began painstakingly to unbutton her coat at the neck, because she suddenly felt stifling hot and her strength had left her.

PHILOSOPHY (continued from page 16)

Thomists were active too. The most important book written from this point of view was S. Swiezawski's *Being*.

One of the features of this first postwar period was a continuing dialogue between dialectical materialism *à la russe* and the representatives of various other philosophical movements. Official philosophy was represented by Adam Schaff, who in the period under discussion published *An Introduction to the Theory of Marxism*, a work which became the major textbook on the subject and which has appeared through the years in many editions, each adjusted to accord with the changing Party line. The same author's contribution to semantics has the title *The Concept and the Word*. Schaff also published a great number of articles in many periodicals. The discussion between the theological brand of Marxism and its various friendly and unfriendly critics lasted for several years. Among the best contributions to this discussion were the articles of S.

Ossowski and K. Ajdukiewicz in the monthly *Contemporary Thought*, and a small volume by N. Lubnicki entitled *The Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism*. The official philosophy was not in a position of advantage in these intellectual battles, because Schaff was fighting almost alone, and although his writings are much superior to the products of the professional Soviet defenders of the philosophical Party line, he was of course bound by the rigid requirements of orthodoxy. And since it is the Church (in this case the Party) that defines orthodoxy—not the other way around—the period of discussion had to come to an end. Along with the much-publicized "Polish way to Socialism," the relative freedom of discussion disappeared.

The second period in the development of postwar philosophy in Poland was that of the Party line philosophy, which had won a victory not on the philosophical but on the political battlefield.

(to be continued)



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